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DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL, DON'T WORK: THE
DISCRIMINATORY EFFECT OF VETERANS'
PREFERENCES ON HOMOSEXUALS
LOUIS J. VIRELLI III*

The constitutional rights of homosexuals have become an increasingly
prevalent issue in America over the last two decades. Supreme Court cases
2
such as Bowers v. Hardwick1 and Romer v. Evans marked the beginning of
serious judicial consideration of whether homosexuals as a class are
constitutionally protected. Recently, however, the debate over homosexual
rights has received unprecedented attention. In 2003, the Supreme Court, in
Lawrence v. Texas,3 overturned Bowers and invalidated a state statute
criminalizing homosexual sodomy. In Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial
Court ruled that denying homosexuals the right to marry violated the State
Constitution,4 a conclusion that was recently echoed by a state trial court in
New York.5 During the 2004 presidential election, eleven states voted in
favor of constitutional amendments banning gay marriage. Post-election
polls indicated that as many as twenty percent of voters in that election cited
"moral issues," including gay marriage, as the most important factor in
choosing a president.6 Gay marriage has also become a federal constitutional
* Trial Attorney, United States Department of Justice. B.S.E., Duke University,
1996; M.S.E., University of Pennsylvania, 1997; J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law
School, 2000. The analyses, views and opinions expressed herein are mine alone and in
no way reflect the position of the Department of Justice or the United States Government.
1. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
2. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
3. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
4. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003). A group of
Massachusetts citizens' attempt to enjoin Goodridge's implementation failed. See Largess
v. Supreme Judicial Court, 373 F.3d 219, 229 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 618
(2004) (denying plaintiffs' request for declaratory and injunctive relief).
5. Hernandez v. Robles, 794 N.Y.S.2d 579, 609 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005), direct appeal
denied, 829 N.E.2d 670 (N.Y. 2005).
6. Todd S. Purdum, All About the President, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2004, at A5
(referring to the "2 in 10 voters who yesterday told pollsters that 'moral issues' mattered to
them more than any other"). Since the election, the precise role of "moral issues" in
affecting the outcome has become the source of some debate. While some commentators
contend that gay marriage was a driving force in the result, others maintain that the result
was a broader political victory, with moral issues such as gay marriage playing only a part.
Joel Achenbach, A Victory for "Values, " but Whose?, WASH. POST., Nov. 4, 2004, at CI.
"[G]ay marriage now seems essential to any conversation about the 2004 election. The
exit polls pointed to a huge boost for Republicans from voters who said their biggest
concern was 'moral values'... [t]he term is basically a code phrase for abortion and

The John MarshallLaw Review

[38:1083

issue. In 2004, Congress considered a constitutional amendment defining
marriage as a heterosexual institution.7
Amid these highly charged and controversial issues, another issue
persists - the right of homosexuals to serve in the armed forces. This issue
received close national attention beginning in 1992 when President-elect Bill
Clinton oversaw the adoption of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy
(DADT).5 Although DADT initially appeared to offer relief from the prior
ban on homosexual military service, the policy falls far short of ensuring
equal opportunity for homosexuals wishing to serve. As a result, thirteen
years later, particularly in the face of growing demands on the military due to
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the issue of homosexuals' right to serve in the
Armed Forces remains a source of active debate.9
Largely omitted from that debate, however, is DADT's effect on
homosexuals' civilian life. Veterans are offered a wide variety of benefits

gays." Id. See Sarah Kershaw, Constitutional Bans on Same-Sex Marriage Gain
Widespread Support in 10 States, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2004, at P9 (identifying eleven
States that passed constitutional amendments banning gay marriage). But see David
Brooks, The Values-Vote Myth, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2004, at A19 (noting that there was
no "disproportionate surge" in evangelical voter turnout in 2004, and arguing that "there is
no one explanation" for the outcome). In any event, regardless of the exact impact of
moral issues, including gay marriage, on the 2004 election, it is clear that gay marriage
obtained national significance on the 2004 campaign trail, and remains an important
political and social issue.
7. See, e.g., Fred Barbash, Bush Urges Congress to Pass Gay MarriageAmendment,
WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A18832004Feb24?language=printer (reporting that President Bush urged Congress to send a
proposed constitutional amendment banning gay marriages to the states); Elizabeth
Mehren, 11 States Back Bans on Gay Unions; Georgia, Ohio Bar PartnerBenefits, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2004, at A21 ("Some advocates of the same-sex marriage bans hailed
Tuesday's votes as evidence of support for an amendment to the U.S. Constitution that
would prevent gays and lesbians from marrying."); Adam Nagourney, Decision on Gay
Marriage Creates a Thorny Issue for 2004 Race, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2003, at Al
(explaining that Massachusetts's Supreme Court decision defending gay marriage caused
"conservatives... [lied by Representative Tom DeLay... to seek
a constitutional
amendment prohibiting marriage between gays").
8. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000).
9. A lawsuit challenging DADT's constitutionality is currently pending in federal
district court. Cook v. Rumsfeld, No. 04-12546 (D. Mass. filed Dec. 6, 2004). A recent
study indicates that approximately fifty percent of junior enlisted service members oppose
DADT, up from sixteen percent in 1992. Press Release, Service Members' Legal Defense
Network, New Poll Shows Shift in Military Attitudes Toward Gays, (October 26, 2004)
available at http://www.sldn.org/templates/press/record.html?record=1674
[hereinafter
New Poll Shows Shift]. See also David S. Broder and John F. Harris, Dean Tackles Kerry's
Record, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2004, at Al (reporting democratic presidential nominee
candidate John Edwards' position that "the military's 'don't ask, don't tell' policy should
be revised"); Service Members' Legal Defense Network, Featured Stories, at
http://www.sldn.org (last visited January 6, 2005) (listing articles about DADT); Robert
Crown Law Library at Stanford Law School, Don't Ask Don't Tell Don't Pursue,
http://dont.stanford.edu (last visited January 6, 2005) (discussing the policy of the U.S.
military regarding sexual orientation); University of California - Santa Barbara, Center for
the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military, http://www.gaymilitary.ucsb.edu (last
visited May 31, 2005) (listing several articles regarding DADT).
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including health care, education, tax, and other financial benefits that are
unavailable to civilians.10 Because these benefits are restricted to veterans,
eligibility is initially determined by the military's admission and discharge
standards, including DADT. 1 1
The purpose of this Article is to focus on one of those benefits veterans' preferences in public hiring - and to consider whether veterans'
preferences' treatment of homosexuals is constitutional in light of their
reliance on DADT to establish eligibility. Section II examines veterans'
preference statutes, in particular, the various state and federal incarnations
Section III addresses the
and their effect on public employment.
development, operation, and implications of DADT. Finally, Sections IV
and V consider DADT's role within veterans' preference statutes in order2 to
Clause.'
analyze the statutes' constitutionality under the Equal Protection
II.
Federal veterans' benefits in the form of pensions, service bonuses,
disability allowances, and hospitalization for combat injuries began as early
as the Revolutionary War. 13 Appointments to federal positions, however,
were less common and14 were usually reserved for former officers, rather than
rank and file soldiers.
The first significant federal hiring preference for veterans was passed at
15
After
the end of the Civil War, and applied only to disabled veterans.
World War I, this preference was expanded to include all honorably
16
In
discharged veterans, their widows, and the wives of injured veterans.
7
It was
1944, Congress enacted the Federal Veterans' Preference Act.'

10. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T VETERANS AFFAIRS, FEDERAL BENEFITS FOR VETERANS
AND DEPENDENTS (2004), available at http://www.pueblo.gsa.gov/cic text/fed__prog/
vabenefits/vetbenefits.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2005) (outlining and describing the
civilian benefits afforded to veterans and their families, including health care programs,
the G.I. Bill, tax credits and opportunities in federal lending).

11. Id. at 1.
12. In the interest of simplicity, the Equal Protection Clause will be used to refer to
both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which incorporates the equal protection doctrine against

the federal Government. See Cruz v. Hauck, 404 U.S. 59, 63 n.10 (1971) (stating that
"[a]lthough no explicit equal protection clause is directed by the Constitution against the
Federal Government the concept of equal protection of the laws is incorporated into the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment") (citing Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
497-99 (1954)).
13. U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., VETGUIDE 58 (2003), available at
http://www.feddesk.com/freehandbooks/ 114-4.pdf (last visited June 5, 2005) [hereinafter
VETGUIDE].

14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 60.
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designed to acknowledge the economic loss suffered by service members and
to facilitate their return to civilian life by making government employment
8
preferentially available to them upon completion of their military service.1
In general, federal government jobs are divided into two categories:
competitive and excepted service. 19 Competitive service jobs are under the
jurisdiction of the Office of Personnel Management and are subject to the
Veterans' Preference Act. 20 Most of the hiring for competitive service
positions is through competitive appointments, in which veterans compete
with other candidates on a "list of eligibles.'
Candidates are placed on a
"list of eligibles" by earning a score of at least seventy out of one hundred on
a civil service examination. 22 Once on the list, veterans who were
discharged from the Armed Forces "under honorable conditions" - with
either an honorable or general discharge - receive an additional five points
on their exam score. 23 Disabled veterans and certain members of disabled or
deceased veterans' families receive a ten point increase.24 When hiring from
a list of eligibles, an agency must select from the top three candidates, but
may not pass over a preferred veteran in favor of a lower-ranking nonveteran without proper justification. 25 An agency may, however, bypass a
non-veteran to hire a lower-scoring veteran without explanation.26
State governments also have a long history of providing veterans with
hiring preferences in public employment, in some cases dating back as far as
the late nineteenth century.27 Currently, all fifty states and the District of
Columbia have veterans' preference statutes.28
Despite the uniform commitment to veterans' preferences, the form of
preference varies widely. For example, some states offer "absolute" hiring
preferences to qualified veterans. 29 These absolute preferences mandate that
a veteran meeting the minimum requirements for a particular position be
18. Id.at 3.
19. U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., VETSINFO GUIDE 3 (2003), available at
http://www.opm.gov/veterans/htm1/vetsinfo.pdf (last visisted June 5, 2005) [hereinafter
VETSINFO GUIDE].
20. 5 U.S.C. §§ 2108, 3309 (2000).
21. VETSINFO GUIDE, supra note 19, at 3.

22. USAJOBS, Federal Employment Information Factsheet: Veterans' Preference 2
(2003) [hereinafter Factsheet].

23. See 5 U.S.C. § 2108(1) (defining "veterans" for purposes of the Act as those who
served in the military during certain time periods and were discharged "under honorable
conditions"); 5 U.S.C. § 2102(2) (2004) (defining "armed forces"); Factsheet, supra note

22, at 1 (explaining that veterans' preference statutes' reference to removal "under
honorable conditions" includes either an honorable or general discharge).
24. See 5 U.S.C. § 2108(2) (defining "disabled veteran"); 5 U.S.C. § 2108(3)(C)-(G)
(listing the members of a disabled veteran's family that are eligible for the 10-point
preference).
25. VETSINFO GUIDE, supra note 19, at 7.
26. Id.
27. Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 261 n.6 (1979).
28. See infra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
29. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 31, § 26 (West 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § I1A:5-5
(West 2004); 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7104 (West 2004); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 3-3-1
(Michie 2004).
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hired regardless of whether more qualified non-veterans are seeking the same
position.3 ° Other state statutes mirror the federal statute, increasing a
veteran's score on a civil service examination by a predetermined number of
simply stating that
points. 3' Still other states offer more general preferences,
32
hiring.
public
in
preferred
be
should
qualified veterans
The definition of a qualified veteran also varies widely by state.
Although all of the state veterans' preference statutes require some minimum
33
term of service, they differ in the type of discharge required. The majority
of states require that a former service member receive an honorable
34
Others
discharge in order to be considered for a veterans' preference.
discharged
follow the federal model by requiring only that a veteran be
"under honorable conditions. 35 Finally, four states require only that a
30. See sources cited supra note 29.

31. COLO. CONST. art. XII § 15; GA. CONST. art. IV, § 3; LA. CONST. art. X, § 10; N.Y.
CONST. art. V, § 6; ALA. CODE § 36-26-15 (2004); ALASKA STAT. § 39-25-159 (2004);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 38-492 (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-3-302 (2004); CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 18978 (West 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5-224 (2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29,
§ 5935 (2004); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-607.03 (2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 295.08 (West
2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 45-2-21 (2004); IDAHO CODE § 65-506 (Michie 2004); 65 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/10-1-16 (2004); IND. CODE § 4-15-2-18 (2004); IOWA CODE § 400.10
(2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18A.150 (2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 7054
(West 2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 35.401, 38.413 (2004); MINN. STAT. § 43A.11
(2004); MO. REV. STAT. § 36.220 (2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-29-102 (2004); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 48-227 (2004); NEV. REV. STAT. 284.260 (2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-913.2 (Michie 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-19.1-02 (2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
124.26 (West 2004); OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, § 840-4.14 (2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 408.230
(2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-4-19 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-30-306 (2004); TEX.
GOV'T CODE ANN. § 657.003 (Vernon 2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 71-10-2 (2004); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 310 (2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-2903 (Michie 2004); WASH. REV.
CODE § 41.04.010 (2004); W. VA. CODE § 6-13-1 (2004); WIS. STAT. § 230.16 (2004);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 19-14-102 (Michie 2004).
32. HAW. REV. STAT. § 76-103 (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2955 (2004); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 96 1/2, § 48 (2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-9-303 (2004); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 283:4 (2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 128-15 (2004). See S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 1-1-550 (2004) (requiring preference "insofar as such preference may be practicable").
33. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XII, § 15 (requiring discharge under "honorable
conditions"); GA. CONST. art. IV, § 3 1 II (requiring honorable discharge); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 128-15 (2004) (requiring discharge under other than dishonorable conditions).
34. GA. CONST. art. IV, § 3; LA. CONST. art. X, § 10; ALA. CODE § 36-26-15; ALASKA
STAT. § 39-25-159; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 38-492; ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-3-302; CAL GOV'T
CODE § 18978; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5-224; GA. CODE ANN. § 45-2-21; 65 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/10-1-16; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18A.150; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 7054;
MD. ANN. CODE art. 96 1/2, § 48; MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 35.401, 38.413; MISS. CODE
ANN. § 25-9-303; MO. REV. STAT. § 36.220; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 283:4; N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 11A:5-5; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-9-13.2; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 124.26; OKLA.
STAT. tit. 74, § 840-4.14; 51 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7104; S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1-550;
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 3-3-1; TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-30-306; TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§ 657.003; VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-2903; WASH. REV. CODE § 41.04.010; W. VA. CODE
§ 6-13-1; WIS. STAT. § 230.16; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 19-14-102.
35. COLO. CONST. art. XII, § 15; N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 6; ARIz. REV. STAT. § 38-492;
D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-607.03; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 295.08; IDAHO CODE § 65-506; IND.
CODE § 4-15-2-18; IOWA CODE § 400.10; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-2955; MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 31, § 26; MINN. STAT. § 43A.11; MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-29-102; NEB.
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former service member not be dishonorably discharged in order to qualify
for a veterans' preference.36
The effect of veterans' preference statutes on public hiring is
significant. For example, in 1986, 35.1% of all non-postal federal employees
were preference-eligible veterans. 37 In 1990, veterans made up 29.8% of the
non-postal federal workforce. 38 Although that number declined somewhat
during the financial boom and military reorganization of the 1990s, by 2000,
veterans still made up more than 26% of the federal, non-postal work force.39
With ongoing military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the number of
preference-eligible veterans will likely increase. 40 This will result in a higher
percentage of public jobs going to preferred veterans, and in turn, a greater
barrier to public employment for non-veterans and former service members
who do not qualify for a veterans' preference. 41 For this reason in particular,
it is important to evaluate the criteria used for granting veterans'
preferences.42

REV. STAT. § 48-227; UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 71-10-2; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 310; W. VA.
CODE § 6-13-1.
36. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 128-15; NEV. REV. STAT. 284.260; N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 37-19.1-02; OR. REV. STAT. § 408.230.
37. U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., BIENNIAL REP. 5, at 7 (2000).

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Ron Hutcheson, Bush Dismisses Talk of Reducing US. Forces in Iraq,
ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Aug. 12, 2005, at IA (reporting that President Bush said
"Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld is considering ways to increase troop strength [in
Iraq]... in the run-up to Iraqi elections scheduled for December"); Ellen Knickmeyer, U.S.
Scales Back Plan to Increase Iraq Forces, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2005 (explaining that the
United States "plans to deploy 2,000 more troops for the October 15 referendum on Iraq's
constitution"); Bradley Graham, Reservists May Face Longer Tours ofDuty, WASH. POST,
Jan. 7, 2005, at Al ("Army leaders are considering seeking a change in Pentagon policy
that would allow for longer and more frequent call-ups of some reservists to meet the
demands of conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan ... "); Robin Wright and Fred Barbash,
Administration Pressed to Increase Troop Strength in Iraq: Pressure Coming From
Republican and Democratic Congressional Leaders, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 2004,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn?pagename=article&contentld=A55098_2004
Apr6&notFound--true ("The Bush administration is coming under intensified pressure
from both Republican and Democratic congressional leaders to boost U.S. troop strength
in Iraq...."); David Stout, Rumsfeld Leaves Door Open for More U.S. Troops in Iraq,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/06/international/06CNDPENT.html?ex=1127188800&en=9396474359a28816&ei=5070&hp ("[Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld] said that the American commanders [in Iraq] would get more soldiers if
they asked for them.").
41. Graham, supra note 40, at Al.
42. Unlike traditional benefits, veterans' preferences are somewhat different in that
they not only offer an advantage to those who are eligible, but inflict a burden on those
that are not. Grace Blumberg, De Facto and De JureSex DiscriminationUnder the Equal
Protection Clause: A Reconsiderationof the Veterans' Preference in Public Employment,
26 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 9 (1976-77). For this reason, it is even more crucial to ensure that the
statutes do not unconstitutionally discriminate.
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To date, the vast majority of equal protection challenges brought
43
against veterans' preferences have been unsuccessful. There is at least one
challenge, however, that the courts have yet to address - whether veterans'
preferences unconstitutionally discriminate against homosexuals. In light of
the military's unique policy regarding homosexual service, this question
raises distinct issues of fairness and equality.
III.
A.

The Military'sHistorical Treatment of Homosexuals

For at least the last century, the United States Armed Forces have
adopted various policies regarding the admission and treatment of
homosexual service members." At the outset of World War II, the military
45
adopted a formal policy to exclude homosexuals from service. As a result,
between four and five thousand men were denied membership during the war
6
and another ten thousand were discharged due to their homosexuality. In
1944, the War Department issued Circular No. 3, which provided for the
47
Under Circular No. 3,
administrative discharge of homosexuals.
48
homosexuals were categorized as either "confirmed" or "first offenders."
If classified as "confirmed," they were administratively discharged or, in
49
For those
cases involving aggravating circumstances, court-martialed.
deemed "first offenders," medical treatment was provided and, depending on
the "success" of the regimen, the serviceman was either retained on active
50
duty, administratively discharged, or court-martialed.

43. See, e.g., Feeney, 442 U.S. at 256; Koch v. Yunich, 533 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1976);
Rios v. Dillman, 499 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1974); Russell v. Hodges, 470 F.2d 212 (2d Cir.
1972); August v. Bronstein, 369 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd, 417 U.S. 901
(1974); Koelfgen v. Jackson, 355 F. Supp. 243 (D. Minn. 1972), af'd, 410 U.S. 976
See J.B. Glen, Annotation, Constitutionality of State Veterans' Public
(1973).
Employment Preference Laws, 161 A.L.R. 494 (1946) (listing earlier cases). But see
Markel v. Mclndoe, 59 F.3d 463, 474 (3d Cit. 1995) (holding that promotional
requirement of Pennsylvania absolute veterans' preference violated clause of Pennsylvania
Constitution in context of promotions). See also Soto-Lopez v. New York City Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 755 F.2d 266, 268 (2d Cir. 1985) (ruling that residency requirement for
veterans' preference failed equal protection scrutiny).
44. For a discussion of the military's policies toward homosexual servicemen and
women prior to World War II, see Jeffrey S. Davis, Military Policy Toward Homosexuals:
Scientific, Historical,and Legal Perspectives, 131 MIL. L. REV. 55, 72-75 (1991). See
also Walter John Krygowski, Comment, Homosexuality and the Military Mission: The
Failureof the "Don'tAsk, Don't Tell" Policy, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 875, 879 & n.37
(1995) (citing WILLIAM B. AYCOCK & SEYMORE W. WURFUL, MILITARY LAW UNDER
THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE 14
45. Id. at 879 & n.39.

(1955)).

46. Id. at 880 & n.40.
47. William A. Woodruff, Homosexuality and Military Service: Legislation,
Implementation, and Litigation,64 UMKC L. REV. 121, 129 (1995).

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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After the war, in 1946, the War Department issued Circular No. 85,
which ordered that enlisted personnel who abstained from homosexual
activity but who nevertheless demonstrated homosexual tendencies were to
be discharged honorably. 5' Two years later, however, in 1948, this more
tolerant approach was amended to require a court-martial or an undesirable
or general discharge, rather than an honorable one, for homosexuals. 2 In
1950, the Department of Defense (DoD) issued a directive outlining a stricter
attitude toward homosexuality for all branches of the service. 53 Each branch
relied on this directive to formulate its own policy. 54 All of the policies
generally prohibited homosexuals from service, except in the instance when
a service member was considered "reclaimable. 55 In 1975, the DoD
reaffirmed its position by describing homosexuals as "unsuitable for military
service. ,,56 In 1978, however, the District of Columbia Circuit overturned
discharges from both the Navy and Air Force on the grounds that both
policies' standards for retention of homosexuals required clarification. 57 In
1980, a Wisconsin District Court struck down the Army's policy on
homosexuals as unconstitutional because its definition of homosexual
tendencies was deemed overbroad.5
As a result of these successful legal challenges, the DoD issued
Department of Defense Directives 1332.14 (separation of enlisted members)
and 1332.30 (separation of officers) in 1981. 59 These directives represented
the DoD's official policy with regard to homosexuals in the military.6 ° The
new policy reiterated that "homosexuality is incompatible with military
service," relying on the premise that homosexuals, as a class, either engaged
in or were likely to engage in homosexual activity, and that such activity was
a threat to military cohesion, efficiency, and discipline. 6' In response to the
recent legal opinions criticizing the individual branches' previous positions
on homosexuality, the new policy eliminated the retention standards found
objectionable by the courts in Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force and

51. Krygowski, supra note 44, at 880.
52. Davis, supra note 44, at 75.

53. Id.
54. Krygowski, supra note 44, at 880.
55. Woodruff, supra note 47, at 130. In 1970, army regulations also distinguished
between those with homosexual "tendencies" and practicing homosexuals. Id. While the
former were discharged for unsuitability, the latter were discharged as unfit for service.

Id.
56. C. Dixon Osbum, A Policy in Desperate Search of a Rationale: The Military's
Policy on Lesbians, Gays andBisexuals, 64 UMKC L. REV. 199, 206 (1995).
57. Matlovich v. Sec'y of the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852, 861 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Berg v.
Claytor, 591 F.2d 849, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
58. BenShalom v. Sec'y of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 975-77 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
59. Department of Defense Directive 1332.14, (Jan. 28, 1982), reprinted in 32 C.F.R.
pt. 41, app. A(H) (1994) [hereinafter 1982 DoD Directive 1332.14]; Department of
Defense Directive 1332.30, (Jan. 15, 1982) [hereinafter 1982 DoD Directive 1332.30].
60. Woodruff, supra note 47, at 132 (citing 1982 DoD Directive 1332.14 and

1332.30).
61. Id.
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tendencies" found
Berg v. Claytor, as well as the definition of "homosexual
62
problematic in BenShalom v. Secretary of the Army,
Instead, Directives 1332.14 and 1332.30 mandated separation of
homosexuals from the armed services when: (1) an individual engaged in,
attempted to engage in, or solicited another to engage in homosexual acts;
(2) an individual admitted to being homosexual; or (3) an individual married
or attempted to marry a person known to be of the same sex. 63 A
homosexual was defined as a person, "regardless of sex, who engages in,
attempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in
homosexual acts." 64 Homosexual activity was defined as "[a]ny bodily
contact, actively undertaken or passively permitted, between members of the
same sex for the purpose of satisfying sexual desires, and.., that a
reasonable person would understand to demonstrate a propensity or intent to
engage in [such] an act.",65 In short, military policy after 1982 constituted an
outright ban on homosexuals, regardless of whether they actually engaged in
homosexual activity. 66
Over the next decade, this policy faced a litany of constitutional
challenges on procedural and substantive due process, 67 free speech, 68 and
equal protection grounds. 69 Although some of these challenges succeeded in
the district courts, 70 the military's exclusion policy was ultimately upheld as
constitutional by all of the circuit courts that addressed the issue.7'
62. Id. at 131-32.
63. Id. at 133 & nn.66-68 (citing 1982 DoD Directive 1332.14).
64. Department of Defense Directive 1332.14, E2.1.5. (Dec. 21, 1993) [hereinafter
1993 DoD Directive 1332.14].
65. Id. at E2.1.6.
66. See Krygowski, supra note 44, at 886 ("[T]he Department of Defense policy [in
1982] affirmed the military's fundamental goal--exclusion of homosexuals from
service.") (citing Davis, supra note 44, at 97); Woodruff, supra note 47, at 132-33
(describing the 1982 policy as "exclud[ing] from service... homosexuals").
67. See, e.g., Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d
1160 (9th Cir. 1992); High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563
(9th Cir. 1990); Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989); Meinhold v.
United States Dep't. of Def., 808 F. Supp. 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1993), a3fd in part and rev'd
and vacated in part, 34 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994); Steffan v. Cheney, 733 F. Supp. 121
(D.D.C. 1989), rev'd, 920 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
68. See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 462 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding
"absolutely no First Amendment violation" in connection with the 1982 DoD policy on
homosexuals).
69. See Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 687 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (overruling panel
decision that military policy regarding homosexuals failed rational basis review under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
70. Two district court decisions, Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910 (W.D.
Wash. 1994) and Dahli v. Sec'y of the United States Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. Cal.
1993), concluded that the military's exclusionary policy toward homosexuals could not
withstand rational basis review under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Those
decisions were later characterized, however, as "undisciplined rebellion against the
governing constitutional doctrine" by the Ninth Circuit. Steffan, 41 F.3d at 689.
71. See cases cited supra notes 66-68. For a more thorough discussion of the
challenges to the 1982 policy, see Krygowski, supra note 44, at 887-906, and Woodruff,
supra note 47, at 135-42.

The John Marshall Law Review

B.

[38:1083

"Don'tAsk, Don't Tell"

The military's treatment of homosexuals received its closest public
scrutiny during the 1992 presidential campaign, when candidate Bill Clinton
made the controversial announcement that he intended to lift the ban on
homosexual service members.72 Once elected, President Clinton directed the
Secretary of Defense to conduct a review of the existing ban.73 In January of
1993, he enacted an interim policy that permitted homosexuals to remain in
the military provided they refrain from homosexual activity. 74 After
hearings in both houses, Congress enacted a new statutory policy, popularly
known as "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" (DADT).75
DADT's stated goal was to alter the prior military ban on homosexuals
"to emphasize that DoD judges the suitability of persons to serve in the
Armed Forces on the basis of conduct, not sexual orientation. 76 Sexual
orientation was described as "a personal and private matter, and is not a bar
",77
to continued service... unless manifested by homosexual conduct ....
The interim policy's suspension of the practice of questioning potential
service members about their sexual preference was also preserved. Secretary
of Defense Les Aspin explained that "no applicant will7 8be asked about his or
her sexual orientation as part of the accession process.,
The actual statutory language of DADT, however, paints a different
picture. 79 The statute begins with fifteen findings of fact that stress, as the
driving forces behind the policy, the singular purpose of the military, the
unique nature of military life, the importance of member morale and unit
cohesion, and the need for personnel policies that exclude those who would
threaten that morale or cohesion. 0 Congress's last finding states that "[t]he
presence in the armed forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or
intent to engage in homosexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to the
high standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that
are the essence of military capability."'', Congress also makes clear that,

72. See President's Remarks Announcing the New Policy on Gays and Lesbians in the
Military, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1369 (July 19, 1993).
73. David A. Schlueter, Gays and Lesbians in the Military: A Rationally Based
Solution to a Legal Rubik's Cube, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393, 394 (1994) (citing
President's Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense on Ending Discrimination on the
Basis of Sexual Orientation in the Armed Forces, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 112
(Jan. 29, 1993)); Woodruff, supra note 47, at 143.
74. Id. at 145.
75. 10 U.S.C. § 654.
76. Press Release, Navy News Service, Secretary Aspin Releases New Regulations on
Homosexual Conduct in the Armed Forces, (Dec. 22, 1993) [hereinafter Aspin Press
Release].
77. 1993 DoD Directive 1332.14, E3.AI.1.8.L.1.
78. Aspin Press Release, supra note 76.
79. 10 U.S.C. § 654.
80. 10 U.S.C. § 654(a).
81. 10 U.S.C. § 654(a)(15).
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although the interim policy's prohibition on inquiring into potential service
members' sexual preference should be continued, "the82Secretary of Defense
may reinstate that questioning" at his or her discretion.
The statute then goes on to define the circumstances under which a
service member will be removed from the armed forces. First, removal is
required if a member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited
another to engage in a homosexual act. 83 A homosexual act is defined as
either "any bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively permitted,
between members of the same sex for the purpose of satisfying sexual
desires," or "any bodily contact which a reasonable person would understand
to demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in an act described
[above]." 84 A "propensity" is defined in the regulations accompanying the
statute as a "likelihood" of engaging in homosexual activity.8 5 Once it is
shown that a service member engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited
another to engage in homosexual acts, the burden shifts
to the service
86
member to demonstrate that separation is not warranted.
A service member must also be removed if the member states that he or
she is a homosexual.8 7 DADT defines the term homosexual as a "person,
regardless of sex, who engages in, attempts to engage in, has a propensity to
engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts. 8 The regulations
accompanying the statute describe a statement that a member is a
homosexual as "[1]anguage or behavior that a reasonable person would
believe was intended to convey the statement that a person engages in,
attempts to engage in, or has a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual
acts." 89 Such a statement creates a rebuttable presumption that the service
member is homosexual. 90 Once this presumption is established, the burden
shifts to the service member to justify his or her retention by demonstrating

82. National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 103-160, 107 Stat. 1547 (codified
as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 654).
83. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1).
84. 10 U.S.C. § 654(0(3).
85. 1993 DoD Directive 1332.14, E2.1.10.
86. In order to carry this burden, the service member must demonstrate that: (1) such
conduct is a departure from the member's usual and customary behavior; (2) such conduct
is unlikely to recur; (3) such conduct was not the result of force, coercion or intimidation;
(4) the member's continued presence in the armed forces is consistent with the armed
forces' interests in proper discipline, good order and morale; and (5) the member does not
have a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1)(A)-(E).
87. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2).
88. 10 U.S.C. § 654(f)(1). "The term 'bisexual' means a person who engages in,
attempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual
and heterosexual acts." 10 U.S.C. § 654(0(2). DADT applies equally to bisexuals and
homosexuals. For convenience, this Article will use the term homosexuals to include both
bisexuals and homosexuals.
89. 1993 DoD Directive 1332.14, E2.1.16.
90. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(2).
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that the presumption is inaccurate. 91 Finally, removal is mandatory under
DADT if a member of the armed forces "has married or attempted to marry a
person known to be of the same biological sex."92
Although initially publicized as an important compromise toward
permitting homosexual service, 93 DADT actually offers little relief for
homosexuals who are, or who aspire to be, service members. In many ways,
DADT is virtually indistinguishable from the ban on homosexuals that
preceded it. 94 First, the criteria for separation and the definitions of
"homosexual" and "homosexual conduct" in DADT are practically identical
to those in the 1982 versions of Directives 1332.14 and 1332.30. DADT and
the prior ban also share a common justification - both policies were enacted
in furtherance of the principle that "homosexuality is incompatible with
military service." 95 Even the most apparent difference between DADT and
the preceding ban - the "don't ask" provision of DADT - is somewhat of
a misnomer. As an initial matter, it is rarely respected. 96 Perhaps more
importantly, however, DADT's "don't ask" provision exists only as a
congressional recommendation; the statute explicitly allows the Defense
Secretary to reinstitute questioning about prospective
service members'
97
sexual preference whenever he or she chooses.
Moreover, despite its stated focus on homosexual conduct over sexual
preference, 98 DADT defines conduct broadly, such that any expression that
91.

Id.

92. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(3).
93. See, e.g., Krygowski, supra note 44, at 911 (noting that DADT "purports to make
significant changes" in the previous policy).
94. See, e.g., id. at 875 ("The 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' (DADT) policy, however,
continues to ban admitted homosexuals or bisexuals from remaining in the armed
forces."); Osbum, supra note 56, at 236 (referring to "the military's class-based exclusion
of gay men and lesbians" under DADT); Scott W. Wachs, Note, Slamming the Closet
Door Shut: Able, Thomasson and the Reality of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell", 41 N.Y.L. SCH.

L. REV. 309, 315 (1996) ("Through its practical effects, the 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' policy
has thus far done little to distinguish itself from the former total ban .... "); Woodruff,
supra note 47, at 153 ("[T]he [DADT] statute was a codification of the 1981 policy in all
material respects.").
95. S. REP. No. 103-112, at 293 (1993); H.R. REP. No. 103-200, at 287 (1993);
Woodruff, supra note 47, at 132 (citing 1982 DoD Directives 1332.14 and 1332.30).
96. See Wachs, supra note 94, at 316 ("[O]ne of the policy's key prongs, refusing to
ask new applicants about their sexual orientation, often is not enforced." (citing Chris
Black, Gays in the Military FindingBacklash, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 5, 1995, at 1)).
97. National Defense Authorization Act §160; See H.R. REP. NO. 103-200, at 288
("This section would also express the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Defense has
the discretion to continue the practice ... of not asking prospective service members about
homosexual conduct.").
98. At its inception, Defense Secretary Les Aspin explained that DADT was intended
to alter the prior military ban on homosexuals "to emphasize that DoD judges the
suitability of persons to serve in the Armed Forces on the basis of conduct, not sexual
orientation." Aspin Press Release, supra note 76. DADT was meant to protect an
applicant from being "asked about his or her sexual orientation as part of the accession
process." Id. DADT explained that sexual orientation is "a personal and private matter,
and is not a bar to continued service ... unless manifested by homosexual conduct." 1993
DoD Directive 1332.14, E3.Al.1.8.1.1.
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demonstrates a propensity or intent to engage in a homosexual act is grounds
for separation.99 DADT prohibits statements by a service member that he or
she is homosexual. As explained above, such statements are defined as
"[l]anguage or behavior that a reasonable person would believe was intended
to convey the statement that a person.., has a propensity or intent to engage
in homosexual acts."' 00 DADT describes a homosexual act as any bodily
contact that a reasonable person would conclude demonstrates a propensity
DADT therefore
or intent to engage in same-sex sexual contact.' 01
proscribes as "homosexual conduct" any verbal or physical expression that
conveys a likelihood or desire to engage in bodily contact with a member of
the same sex that would reasonably indicate a likelihood or desire to engage
in sexual activity with that individual. In other words, DADT requires
removal of a service member who does something that could indicate that
they may touch someone of the same sex in a way that could mean that they
want to have sex with that person. Under this standard, "conduct" can be
described as nearly any form of personal expression or "revelation of 'an
abstract preference' for persons of the same sex."'10 2 DADT therefore
operates as a prohibition not just on specific actions, but on any activity that
may reveal an individual's homosexuality. The result is an effective
prohibition on homosexual military service. The only apparent option under
DADT for a homosexual seeking to join or remain in the military is to appear
"straight" - to repress any and all expression that could be interpreted to
hint at a homosexual preference.
The procedural aspects of DADT likewise do little to distinguish it
from the prior ban on homosexual service. DADT grants commanding
officers wide latitude in determining whether sufficient evidence exists to
justify a presumption of homosexuality and whether a service member was
able to rebut that presumption. 1 3 While discretionary decision-making
could be exercised to the advantage of homosexual service members, that has
not generally been the case.' ° 4 Instead of triggering widespread compassion
and recognition of loyal service, backlash against homosexual service
members has led to "witch hunts" and coercion of allegedly gay service
members either to confess or to inform on other members.' °5 In short, the
99. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b); See H.R. REP. NO. 103-220, at 287 ("One non-verbal
statement in and of itself could be grounds for separation.").
100. 1993 DoD Directive 1332.14, E2.1.16.
101. 10 U.S.C. § 654(f)(3).
102. Woodruff, supra note 47, at 171.
103. See S. REP. No. 103-112, at 291 ("The committee notes that military commanders
and investigative agencies have broad powers to initiate inquiries, inspections, and
investigations."); H.R. REP. No. 103-200, at 289 ("[T]he committee also believes that
commanders... should have great discretion as to what constitutes sufficient information
to begin an inquiry.., about behavior or actions that could have an impact on unit
cohesion, morale, welfare and discipline."); Wachs, supra note 94, at 316 ("Enforcement
of the 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' policy rests within the discretion of individual
commanders.").
104. See Wachs, supra note 94, at 316-17 (stating that investigations have been
commenced based on unsupported allegations).
105. Id. See Osburn, supra note 56, at 229 (referring to the "relentless attempts by
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presumption in favor 0 of
removing alleged homosexuals has become
"virtually irrebuttable."' 6
The same discretionary enforcement problem exists in the
characterization of homosexual service members' separation. A separation
may be classified as "honorable" when a member's service has, in the eyes
of his or her commanding officer, "met the standards of acceptable
conduct." 10 7 Since DADT claims only to prohibit "conduct,"10 8 behavior
justifying removal under DADT could easily be characterized as
unacceptable and, in turn, result in a less than honorable discharge.
A similar concern is present with general discharges. A general
discharge is appropriate when a member's service "has been honest and
faithful," but "significant negative aspects" outweigh the positive
components of that service. 0 9 If the "negative aspects" of an individual's
service rise to the level of a "pattern of behavior that constitutes a significant
departure from the conduct expected" of service members,110 that service
member faces a discharge under "other than honorable conditions."''
In
light of Congress's conclusion that homosexuality is incompatible with
military service,' 1 2 it is not difficult to imagine how a commanding officer
could justify a finding that homosexual conduct represents such a significant
departure and merits a discharge under other than honorable conditions.
Although commanding officers are not prohibited from granting
homosexual service members honorable discharges, the issue of discharge
characterizations remains a serious concern for gay veterans." 3 There exists
a disturbing "lack of parity in the treatment of gay, compared to straight,

some military commanders to 'witch hunt' or otherwise 'ferret-out' lesbian, gay and
bisexual servicemembers" [sic]); H.R. REP. No. 103-200, at 289 (1993) (recalling
testimony about military personnel abusing "their authority by conducting so-called
'witch-hunts' to ferret out homosexuals").
106. Krygowski, supra note 44, at 921 (quoting Able v. United States, 847 F. Supp.
1038, 1044 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)); Woodruff, supra note 47, at 170 (describing the service
member's burden of rebuttal as "a very high burden" and stating that "no one has ever
[met] it").
107. 1993 DoD Directive 1332.14, E3.A2.1.3.2.2.1.
108. See id. at 4.1.1 (describing DADT as judging the "suitability of persons to serve in
the Armed Forces on the basis of their conduct" (emphasis in original)).
109. See id. at E3.A2.1.3.2.2.2 (defining general discharge and "under honorable
conditions").
110. Id. atE3.A2.1.3.2.2.3.
111. Id. atE3.A2.1.3.2.2.3.1.1.
112. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 103-112, at 278 ("The presence in military units of persons
who, by their acts or statements, demonstrate a propensity to engage in homosexual acts,
would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order and
discipline, and unit cohesion that are essential to effective combat capability."); H.R. REP.
No. 103-200, at 287 ("[T]he committee concludes that homosexuality is incompatible with
military service.").
113. Hearing on Veterans' Issues Before the House Comm. on Veterans' Affairs,
Subcomm. On Oversight and Investigations, 103d Cong. 4 (1994) [hereinafter Hearing]
(testimony of Michelle M. Benecke, Co-Director, Servicemembers Legal Defense
Network).
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removals under DADT being
personnel,"'1 14 which results in many
15
characterized as less than honorable.'
Not surprisingly, DADT has, like its predecessor, faced multiple
constitutional challenges. Of the four federal appellate courts to entertain
such challenges, all of them have found the policy constitutional for
essentially the same reasons.' 16 After determining that the statute must be
evaluated under the rational basis test, the courts all focused on the deference
owed to legislative decision-making and to the judgment of military
commanders in the military context.1 17 The courts went on to conclude that
the statutes' and the military's stated interest in maintaining unit cohesion
118
was legitimate, and that DADT is rationally related to that interest.
114. Id.
115. Id. See STACEY L. SOBEL ET. AL., CONDUCT UNBECOMING: THE SEVENTH
ANNUAL REPORT ON "DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL, DON'T PURSUE, DON'T HARASS" 64
(2001) [hereinafter SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT] (explaining that former members of the
Navy receive lower discharge characterizations for being discharged under DADT);
SERVICEMEMBERS LEGAL DEF. NETWORK, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: THE FIFTH ANNUAL
REPORT ON "DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL, DON'T PURSUE" 16 (1999) [hereinafter FIFTH
ANNUAL REPORT] (explaining that service members who admit to being gay receive
"lower discharge characterizations").
116. Able, 155 F.3d at 636; Holmes v. California Nat'l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th
Cir. 1997); Philips v. Perry, 106 F.3d 1420, 1429 (9th Cir. 1997); Richenburg v. Perry, 97
F.3d 256, 260 (8th Cir. 1996); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 928 (4th Cir. 1996). With
the exception of Able, these cases also involved First Amendment challenges, which are
beyond the scope of this discussion.
117. See Able, 155 F.3d at 632 (explaining that "we are required to give great deference
to Congressional judgments in matters affecting the military"). "Courts are to 'give great
deference to the professional judgment of military authorities concerning the relative
importance of a particular military interest."' Id. (quoting Goldman v. Weinberger, 475
U.S. 503, 507 (1986)). See also Holmes, 124 F.3d at 1133 ("[Olur review is especially
deferential in the military context."). "Regulations which might infringe constitutional
rights in other contexts may survive scrutiny because of military necessities." Id. (quoting
Philips, 106 F.3d at 1425); Richenburg, 97 F.3d at 261-62 ("Substantive due process
review is especially deferential when military policy is challenged .... Moreover, at a
more practical level, deference to the considered professional judgment of military
")(citations omitted);
authorities is appropriate ....
[J]udicial deference ... is at its apogee when legislative action under the
congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules and regulations
for their governance is challenged .... We are, in addition, to 'give great deference
to the professional judgment of military authorities concerning the relative
importance of a particular military interest.'
Philips, 106 F.3d at 1425 (quoting Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507); Thomasson, 80 F.3d at
921-26 (stating that courts have little competence when it comes to military judgments).
118. See Able, 155 F.3d at 634 ("[T]he United States has justified § 654's prohibition on
homosexual conduct on the basis that it promotes unit cohesion, enhances privacy and
reduces sexual tension."); Holmes, 124 F.3d at 1136 (concluding that DADT is "rationally
related to the government's interest of [preventing risks to unit cohesion by] excluding
persons from military service based on homosexual conduct"). The following cases stand
for the same proposition stated in Holmes. Philips, 106 F.3d at 1429; Richenburg, 97 F.3d
at 262.
It was legitimate.., for Congress to conclude that sexual tensions and attractions
could play havoc with a military unit's discipline and solidarity .... [I]tis
legitimate for Congress to proscribe homosexual acts, it is also legitimate for the
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Therefore, although the wisdom of these decisions has generated
considerable discussion in scholarly literature," 9 DADT's constitutionality
as a military policy has been rendered virtually unassailable as a practical
matter. Left unresolved, however, is the question of whether the application
of DADT in the civilian context is constitutional,
in particular with regard to
20
veterans' preferences in public employment.
IV.
As explained above, veterans' preference statutes have survived
allegations that they unconstitutionally discriminate against women and nonveterans in public employment, 12 ' and DADT has survived constitutional
challenges to its treatment of homosexuals in the military. 22 The interaction
of the two, however, has been effectively overlooked. Veterans' preferences
rely on the military's admission standards, including DADT, to establish
eligibility for benefits. As a result, they run the risk of replicating DADT's
discriminatory treatment of homosexuals in the military 123 in their provision
government to seek to forestall these same dangers by trying to prevent the
commission of such acts. The statements provision, by discharging those with a
propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts, operates in this preventative
way.
Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 929 (emphasis in original).
119. See, e.g., Captain John A. Carr, The Difference Between Can and Should: Able v.
United States and the Continuing Debate About Homosexual Conduct in the Military, 46
A.F. L. REV. 1 (1999); Wachs, supra note 94; Woodruff, supra note 47; Krygowski, supra
note 44; Schlueter, supra note 73.
120. The constitutional question becomes even more significant in light of the lack of
statutory remedies for employment discrimination against homosexuals. Federal and state
veterans' preference statutes are expressly excluded from suit under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-1 1 (2000).
Although eleven states-California, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont
and Wisconsin-and the District of Columbia have laws prohibiting employment
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, it is unclear whether these statutes would
provide a remedy for homosexuals excluded from their own state's veterans' preference
program. Michelle Eisenmenger, Sexual OrientationDiscrimination:Teachers as Positive
Role Models for Tolerance, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 235, 235 (2002) (citing Tracy Davis & Sarah
Oppenheim, Legislative Focus: Extending Non-Discrimination in Employment to Gays
and Lesbians, 7 HuM. RTS. BR. 32 (2000)). At minimum, however, there is no statutory
relief for homosexuals in the remaining 40 States or at the federal level who were denied
veterans' preference benefits. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl.2 (Supremacy Clause).
121. See, e.g., Feeney, 442 U.S. at 256; Koch, 533 F.2d at 80; Rios, 499 F.2d at 329;
Russell, 470 F.2d at 212; August, 369 F. Supp. at 195; Koelfgen, 355 F. Supp. at 254. See
Glen, supra note 43, at 494-503 (listing earlier cases). But see Soto-Lopez, 755 F.2d at
268 (ruling that the residency requirement for veterans' preference failed equal protection
scrutiny); Markel, 59 F.3d at 474 (holding that the promotional requirement of
Pennsylvania absolute veterans' preference violated the Pennsylvania Constitution in
context of promotions).
122. See, e.g., Able, 155 F.3d at 628; Holmes, 124 F.3d at 1126; Philips, 106 F.3d at
1420; Richenburg, 97 F.3d at 256; Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 915.
123. There is an argument as to whether DADT discriminates against homosexuals or,
as its original proponents contend, against those who engage in homosexual conduct,
regardless of sexual preference. In light of the breadth of DADT's language and the high
level of discretion granted to commanding officers in its enforcement, it seems clear that
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124
This civilian application of
of civilian public employment benefits.
DADT raises an interesting, and heretofore unexamined, constitutional
question - do veterans' preferences, by virtue of their incorporation of
so as to unconstitutionally deny
DADT, discriminate against homosexuals
25
them equal protection of the laws?

A.

Standardof Review

The question of the statutes' constitutionality depends heavily on the
applicable standard of review. This question, in turn, depends on whether
veterans' preference statutes' reliance on DADT constitutes a discriminatory
classification of homosexuals and, if so, on the level of equal protection
scrutiny applied to that classification.
DADT is not limited to precluding only overt, same-sex sexual contact, but indeed any
perception of homosexual preference in the military. See 1993 DoD Directive 1332.14,
E2.1.16 (prohibiting "[lianguage or behavior that a reasonable person would believe was
intended to convey the statement that a person.., has a propensity to engage in
homosexual acts"). Moreover, DADT's provision granting those accused of violating
DADT the opportunity to rebut the presumption of homosexual conduct insulates nonhomosexual service members from removal under DADT even in cases where they may
have otherwise met the policy's definition of homosexual conduct. See also 10 U.S.C. §
654(b)(1), (2) (explaining that removal under DADT may be avoided where the service
member can establish that any alleged homosexual conduct was "a departure from the
member's usual and customary behavior," and that "the member does not have a
propensity to engage in homosexual acts"). Therefore, despite its claim to focus on
conduct rather than preference, DADT nevertheless inevitably extends to service members
with a homosexual preference, regardless of whether they have engaged in same-sex
sexual contact.
124. It may be argued that veterans' preferences are not purely civilian benefits because
they are limited to former service members and are meant to serve purposes that are
related to military service. This ignores, however, the statutes' many civilian qualities.
First, they are civilian in the literal sense, in that they regulate civilian employment. They
are also designed to serve a number of purely civilian goals, such as facilitating former
service members' return to civilian society and attracting loyal and disciplined individuals
to civilian employment. Even their goal of rewarding military service is primarily a
civilian concern, as the military ostensibly has no direct interest in how or whether its
former members are recognized for their efforts after leaving military service. In fact,
incentivizing military service is the only stated goal of veterans' preferences that has any
direct impact on the military. Finally, courts reviewing veterans' preferences have treated
them as civilian statutes by not granting them the judicial deference reserved for military
policies. Therefore, without attempting to articulate a definitive standard by which to
differentiate between military and civilian statutes, there are strong arguments for treating
veterans' preferences as civilian.
125. The answer cannot be found in the prior, independent analyses of either veterans'
preferences or DADT. As an initial matter, the constitutionality of veterans' preferences'
treatment of homosexuals is an issue of first impression. As for DADT, it has only been
analyzed in the military context and, therefore, has only been subjected to the lenient
standard of review reserved for military policies. See, e.g., Able, 155 F.3d at 632
(explaining that "we are required to give great deference to Congressional judgments in
matters affecting the military"). "Courts are to 'give great deference to the professional
judgment of military authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular military
interest."' Id. at 633 (quoting Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507). Therefore, in order to evaluate
DADT's constitutionality in the public employment context, it is important that the
standard governing veterans' preferences, rather than military policies, be applied.
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1.

Veterans' Preferences' ClassificationofHomosexuals
Veterans' preference statutes do not contain explicit language
excluding or limiting homosexuals' access to benefits. They are, for present
purposes, facially neutral. 26 This does not mean, however, that their
treatment of homosexuals is not reviewable under the Equal Protection
Clause. Where a facially neutral statute contains either a "covert or overt"
discriminatory classification,127 that classification is subject to the same
28
equal protection scrutiny as a facially discriminatory provision.1
Veterans' preferences contain such a discriminatory classification as a
result of their reliance on DADT to establish eligibility for benefits. Unlike
other facially neutral statutes that simply have an adverse effect on particular
groups, 129 veterans' preferences rely on a policy - DADT - that overtly

126. Veterans' preferences are of course not entirely neutral on their face, as they
explicitly exclude non-veterans. For purposes of this analysis, however, the statutes'
classification of non-veterans will be treated as synonymous with neutrality, as their
exclusion of non-veterans has survived equal protection review, and in any event, is not
the determining factor in whether the statutes unconstitutionally discriminate against
homosexuals. See discussion supra note 120.
127. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274 (applying the disparate impact test through a "twofold
inquiry"). "The first question is whether the statutory classification is indeed neutral in the
sense that it is not gender based. If the classification itself, covert or overt, is not based
upon gender, the second question is whether the adverse effect reflects invidious genderbased discrimination." Id.
128. See id. at 273 (explaining that any public employment law containing a
discriminatory classification would be subject to "a constitutional challenge under the
Equal Protection Clause").
129. Statutes that do not contain discriminatory classifications but nevertheless result in
a discriminatory impact on a particular group are constitutionally reviewable under the
disparate impact doctrine. Such statutes are unconstitutional under the disparate impact
doctrine only where their disparate impact is the result of a discriminatory legislative
purpose. Id. at 272 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) and Vill. of
Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)). The disparate
impact doctrine is based on the principle that the Equal Protection Clause guarantees
"equal laws, not equal results." Id. at 273. It is also based on the
premise that the social
impact of a particular law is not a constitutional question, but rather one that should be
addressed, if at all, by further legislation. See id. at 272 ("[T]he manner in which a
particular law reverberates in a society, is a legislative and not a judicial responsibility.").
The disparate impact doctrine is reserved for statutes that are not based on discriminatory
classifications, but that, when combined with independent social conditions such as
patterns of prejudice in "interrelated 'gateway' areas (such as] housing, employment and
education," lead to unequal results for particular individuals or groups. LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-20, at 1511 (2nd ed. 1988). See also, e.g.,
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (examining the effect of political redistricting
statute as caused by racial prejudice); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991) (jury
selection); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (jury selection); Rogers v. Lodge, 458
U.S. 613 (1982) (political redistricting); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S.
457 (1982) (educational redistricting); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980)
(political redistricting); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979)
(educational redistricting); New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979)
(prohibition on narcotics use); Vill. ofArlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 252 (1977) (zoning);
Washington, 426 U.S. at 229 (1976) (public hiring). These social conditions represent an
intervening cause in disparate impact cases that creates a degree of attenuation between the
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Veterans' preference statutes'
discriminates against homosexuals.
incorporation of DADT ensures that they will likewise discriminate. Their
apparent neutrality is thus irrelevant, as there is no meaningful difference
between a statute that itself singles out homosexuals and one that, although
seemingly neutral on its face, incorporates a statute or policy that is overtly
discriminatory. Therefore, veterans' preferences should not be considered
neutral with respect to homosexuals, but should be subject to equal
protection scrutiny of their discriminatory treatment of homosexuals through
their application of DADT in the public employment context.
This conclusion is consistent with the Court's analysis in Personnel
Administrator of Massachusettsv. Feeney. The Feeney Court concluded that
Massachusetts' veterans' preference statute was not facially discriminatory
It then asked whether the statute established "a
against women.
30
classification that is overtly or covertly based upon gender."' In answering
that question in the negative, the Court relied on a number of facts and
circumstances that do not exist with respect to veterans' preferences. It
focused on the fact that women were not excluded from the military or
veterans' benefits,131 and that Massachusetts' veterans' preference statute did
not "intentionally incorporate[] ...the panoply of sex-based and assertedly
discriminatory federal laws that have prevented all but a handful of women
from becoming veterans. 132 In concluding that the statute was not facially
discriminatory, the Court explained that "[t]he enlistment policies of the
Armed Services may well have discrimination [sic] on the basis of sex. But
the history of discrimination against women in the military is not on trial in
this case."'

133

These rationales do not apply, however, to veterans' preferences'
treatment of homosexuals. In fact, the Feeney Court's refusal to find a
classification based on gender provides a number of instructive
considerations that counsel in favor of concluding that such a classification
does exist in veterans' preferences with respect to homosexuals. For
example, veterans' preferences' incorporation of DADT establishes
classifications that are at least in part based on sexual preference. DADT
creates a mandatory threshold for military enrollment and retention - and,
statute under review and the disparate results. This attenuation justifies application of the
disparate impact doctrine, as it protects courts from assuming the legislative role of
combating patterns of prejudice, and permits them to focus on an issue that is more
properly the subject of judicial review, namely legislative purpose. See TRIBE, supra at
1511 (discussing the role of "patterns of... prejudice" in disparate impact cases); Feeney,
442 U.S. at 272 ("[T]he manner in which a particular law reverberates in a society, is a
legislative and not a judicial responsibility."). By contrast, veterans' preference statutes'
discriminatory treatment does not depend on such patterns of prejudice, but is the product
of the statutes' incorporation of language-DADT-that explicitly discriminates against
homosexuals. Veterans' preferences are therefore not the type of statute that the disparate
impact doctrine was designed to address.
130. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 274.
131. Id. at 275 (stating that "Massachusetts has consistently defined veteran status in a
way that has been inclusive of women," and that veteran status "is not uniquely male").
132. Id. at276.
133. Id. at 278 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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in turn, veterans' preference benefits - based on whether an individual is, or
could reasonably appear to be, homosexual.134 No such threshold exists
35
regarding gender, either now or at the time Feeney was decided.
Veterans' preferences' reliance on DADT also constitutes an intentional
incorporation of a discriminatory federal law in a way that the statutes'
reliance on gender-related policies does not. Unlike the military's treatment
of women at the time Feeney was decided, DADT is an explicit policy with
the ability to effectively preclude homosexuals' access to veterans' benefits.
Therefore, a review of veterans' preferences' constitutionality will not focus
on the history of discrimination against homosexuals, as the Feeney Court
described its gender-based review, 136 but instead will address active
discrimination that seriously impacts the availability of benefits. For these
reasons, veterans' preferences should be treated as discriminatory against
homosexuals. 37

134. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b), (f); 1993 DoD Directive 1332.14, E2.1.16. See also discussion
supra Part III.B.

135. See Feeney, 442 U.S. at 275 ("Veteran status is not uniquely male.").
136. This is not to suggest that the military is entirely free of gender bias, but simply to
point out that in the Feeney Court's view, the military's treatment of women at the time
Feeney was decided did not pose a sufficient threat to female eligibility for veterans'
benefits to justify categorizing the statutes as gender-based. See id. at 275, 278
(explaining that "Massachusetts has consistently defined veteran status in a way that has
been inclusive of women," and that veteran status "is not uniquely male," and concluding
that Massachusetts' veterans' preference was not gender-based because "the history of
discrimination against women in the military is not on trial in this case") (emphasis
added). By contrast, DADT is responsible for the exclusion and removal of a large
number of homosexual service members annually, and its highly discretionary application
puts homosexuals in serious danger of being excluded from military service altogether.
See Service Members' Legal Defense Network, About Don't Ask, Don't Tell, availableat

http://www.sldn.orgibinary-data/SLDNARTICLES/pdf file/1455.pdf (last visited Oct. 6,
2005) (providing statistics on number of service members removed annually under DADT
from 1994 through 2003). See also supra notes 103-115 and accompanying text
(describing the discretionary nature of DADT and its potential to act as a ban on
homosexual service). This discriminatory treatment of homosexuals limits their ability to
serve such that their ability to receive veterans' preferences is constantly in danger of
being eradicated. As a result, veterans' preferences' reliance on DADT is distinct from the
military's treatment of women such that the Feeney Court's conclusion that
Massachusetts' veterans' preference was not gender-based does not preclude a different
conclusion with respect to veterans' preference statutes' treatment of homosexuals.
137. This seems to beg the question whether Feeney would have been decided
differently if the military had a clearer policy of discriminating against women. Besides
being beyond the scope of this Article, that question is difficult to answer because the
constitutional analysis of veterans' preferences' treatment of women is different from the
analysis of the statutes' treatment of homosexuals. First, depending on when the challenge
was brought, different levels of equal protection scrutiny could be applied. Gender
classifications, unlike classifications based on sexual preference, are currently reviewed
under intermediate scrutiny. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,
441 (1985) ("A gender classification fails unless it is substantially related to a sufficiently
important governmental interest."). Even assuming, however, that veterans' preferences'
treatment of women would be reviewed under the rational basis test, the military's purpose
behind its policy on women may be different from that for DADT. The constitutional
questions of whether the policies are rationally related to a legitimate government purpose
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The obvious critique of this analysis is that it is largely a matter of
semantics. To say that neutral statutes that incorporate discriminatory
standards must be treated as if they are facially discriminatory is
indistinguishable from the uncontroversial position that every discriminatory
provision must pass constitutional muster. In situations where a neutral
statute adopts a discriminatory provision, the discriminatory provision can be
just as easily challenged on its own. If it is ruled unconstitutional, it would
presumably also be invalid if incorporated into other statutes. The question
of whether the neutral statute should be subject to an equal protection
challenge would be moot.
This is not the case, however, with veterans' preferences. Unlike the
hypothetical situation just described, veterans' preferences incorporate
DADT, a discriminatory military policy. Because of the judicial deference
afforded military policies, 138 the safeguard of a direct challenge to DADT is
less meaningful because such a challenge would not be subject to the same
standard that is applied to civilian statutes like veterans' preferences.
Therefore, where seemingly neutral statutes incorporate explicitly
discriminatory military policies, those statutes should receive two layers of
review: one to determine the constitutionality of the neutral language, and
another to evaluate the constitutionality of the facially discriminatory
military policy in its current context. Under this formulation, veterans'
preference statutes' constitutionality depends not only on whether the
statutes' preferential treatment of veterans is constitutional, a question that
139
has been largely answered in the affirmative, but on whether the statutes'
treatment of homosexuals through their incorporation of DADT passes
constitutional muster in the civilian public employment context. Any other
approach would lead to unacceptable results both doctrinally and
normatively by insulating veterans' preferences' civilian treatment of
homosexuals from anything other than the deferential constitutional review
to a second layer of
afforded military policies, and subjecting homosexuals
1 40
discriminatory treatment in public employment.
are thus distinct. In general, however, there does not appear to be any reason why the
analysis of veterans' preference statutes' treatment of homosexuals suggested herein could
not be applied in similar situations where a different group's access to veterans'
preferences was inhibited by an explicitly discriminatory military policy.
138. See, e.g., Able, 155 F.3d at 632 (explaining that "we are required to give great
deference to Congressional judgments in matters affecting the military"). "Courts are to
'give great deference to the professional judgment of military authorities concerning the
relative importance of a particular military interest."' Id. at 632-33 (quoting Goldman,
475 U.S. at 507)). See Holmes, 124 F.3d at 1133 ("[O]ur review is especially deferential
in the military context."); id. (stating that "' [r]egulations which might infringe
constitutional rights in other contexts may survive scrutiny because of military
necessities."' (quoting Philips, 106 F.3d at 1425)).
139. See, e.g., Feeney, 442 U.S. at 256.
140. Although not necessary in light of the above argument that veterans' preference
statutes should be treated as discriminatory against homosexuals, it is worth noting that
even if that argument were to fail, veterans' preferences' treatment of homosexuals would
not necessarily be immune from equal protection review. On the contrary, their treatment
of homosexuals would be subject to constitutional review if their incorporation of DADT
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RationalBasis Review

Once the issue is framed to focus on veterans' preferences' application
of DADT in the civilian context, the next question is the proper level of
equal protection scrutiny.' 41 The Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit
all statutory classifications, but instead requires that such classifications be
properly related to a sufficient government interest. 42 In the case of suspect
or quasi-suspect classifications such as race or gender, statutes must undergo
a more rigorous standard of judicial review. 143 In all other cases, however,
was found to be the result of a "discriminatory purpose." Id. at 272. In Washington, the
Supreme Court refused to treat a verbal skills examination for admission into the District
of Columbia police department (Test 21) as racially discriminatory despite the fact that
blacks failed the test four times more than whites. 426 U.S. at 229. The Court announced
the rule that the "invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must
ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose," and concluded that the fact that
a disproportionate number of black applicants failed to qualify was not sufficient to
conclude that the requirement was purposefully discriminatory. Id. at 240. This
conclusion was affirmed in Village of Arlington Heights, where the Court denied a
developer's equal protection challenge to the local authorities' refusal to change the
zoning classification for a particular tract of land from single-family to multi-family
housing. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 252. The developer claimed that the
refusal to classify the property was racially motivated, because it prevented him from
building racially integrated low and moderate-income housing on the tract. Id. at 254.
The Court held that although the "historical background of the [governmental] decision is
one evidentiary source" for determining if the decision was racially motivated, there was
no reason not to accept the Village's neutral justification that it was committed to "singlefamily homes as its dominant residential land use." Id. at 267-69. The Court elaborated
on its definition of discriminatory purpose in Feeney when it explained that a finding of
discriminatory intent requires that the decision maker drafted a provision "at least in part
'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."
Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279. The Court went on, however, to explain that proof of
discriminatory purpose will typically depend on objective factors, such as the background
and legislative history of a decision, and the results it achieves. Id. at 279 n.24. It also
explained that the inevitability or foreseeability of adverse effects can create a "strong
inference" in favor of intent. Id. at 279 n.25. While it seems unlikely that individual
legislatures adopted veterans' preferences out of malice toward homosexuals, it is easy to
identify the statutes' harmful results for homosexuals and to establish that these adverse
effects were inevitable. Unlike veterans' preferences' negative effects on women, which
the Feeney Court described as the product of a "history of discrimination against women
in the military," the negative effects on homosexuals from veterans' preferences are the
result of an ongoing explicit, discriminatory policy against homosexuals. Id. at 278. It is
at best extremely difficult to argue that legislators were anything other than certain that
their classification of veterans would negatively impact homosexuals. Id. at 279 n.24. If
the Feeney Court drew a strong inference of legislative intent with regard to gender,
veterans' preference statutes' treatment of homosexuals must carry an even stronger one.
Therefore, in light of the inevitability that veterans' preferences would negatively impact
homosexuals, it is at least arguable that their treatment of homosexuals should be subject
to equal protection review, regardless of whether they are deemed to contain a "covert or
overt" classification of homosexuals. Id. at 274.
141. See Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. at 439-42 (outlining the three distinct levels
of review under the Equal Protection Clause).
142. See, e.g., Feeney, 442 U.S. at 271 ("The equal protection guarantee of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the States all power of classification.").
143. See Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. at 440 ("[W]hen a statute classifies by race,
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statutory classifications satisfy the Equal Protection Clause when they are
related to a legitimate governmental purpose - the "rational basis
rationally
14 4
,
test. "

Historically, homosexuals have not been treated as a constitutionally
suspect or quasi-suspect class.1 45 As a result, statutes discriminating against
146
This is
homosexuals have not been subject to heightened scrutiny.
evidenced in all of the cases addressing the constitutionality of DADT, as
well as in the overwhelming majority of cases involving DADT's
predecessor policies. 147 Therefore, for the time being it appears that
homosexuals will remain a non-suspect class for equal protection purposes,
and statutes that 148discriminate against them will be reviewed under the
rational basis test.

alienage, or national origin... [it is] subjected to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only
if [it is] suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest."). "A gender classification
fails unless it is substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental interest." Id.
at 441.
144. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230 (1981) ("Unless a statute
employs a classification that is inherently invidious or that impinges on fundamental
rights... this Court consistently has required that legislation classify the persons it affects
in a manner rationally related to legitimate governmental objectives.").
145. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996) (applying rational basis test to
State constitutional amendment prohibiting "legislative, executive or judicial action...
designed to protect" homosexuals); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (applying
rational basis test to sodomy statute).
146. See supra note 145.
147. See, e.g., Able, 155 F.3d at 628 (upholding DADT against constitutional
challenge); Holmes, 124 F.3d at 1126; Philips, 106 F.3d at 1420; Richenburg, 97 F.3d at
256; Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 915. See also Steffan, 41 F.3d at 684 (overruling panel
decision that 1982 military policy regarding homosexuals failed rational basis review
under the Fourteenth Amendment). For a more thorough discussion of the failed
challenges to the 1982 policy, see Krygowski, supra note 44, at 887-906, and Woodruff,
supra note 47, at 135-42.
148. See, e.g., Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 230 ("Unless a statute employs a classification
that is inherently invidious or that impinges on fundamental rights... this Court
consistently has required that legislation classify the persons it affects in a manner
rationally related to legitimate governmental objectives."). Recent decisions of the United
States and Massachusetts Supreme Courts, however, may mark the beginning of a change
in the way sexual preference is treated under the Constitution. In Lawrence, 539 U.S. at
558, the United States Supreme Court struck down a Texas law prohibiting homosexual
sodomy among consenting adults. Although Lawrence relied on the Due Process Clause,
it acknowledged the "emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult
persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex." Id. at
558. This reference to a constitutional right to privacy for homosexuals evidences a
potential shift toward homosexuals being considered a suspect or quasi-suspect class under
the Equal Protection Clause, and has inspired new attacks on DADT's constitutionality.
See Cook, No. 04-12546. A similar message was conveyed by the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts in Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 941, and by the New York Supreme Court
in Hernandez, 794 N.Y.S.2d at 579. In Goodridge,the court struck down a Massachusetts
law limiting the definition of marriage to the union of a man and a woman on the grounds
that it violated both the due process and equal protection clauses of the Massachusetts
Constitution. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 941. In striking the statute, the court concluded
that the exclusion of same-sex couples from civil marriage could not satisfy the rational
basis test under either constitutional provision. Id. at 968. The court then went on to
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In cases involving discrimination against a non-suspect but politically
unpopular group, however, the precise application of the rational basis test
has been the target of some debate. In Williamson v. Lee Optical,149 the
Supreme Court explained that "the law need not be in every respect logically
consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil
at hand for correction, and that... the particular legislative measure was a
' 50
rational way to correct it.'
In a number of other cases applying rational basis review, however, the
Court has indicated that a higher standard must be met where a statute
exhibits "animus toward the class it affects,"' 5 1 or "a bare... desire to harm a
politically unpopular group."' 15 2 In Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno,153 for
example, the Court concluded that a statute excluding households with one
or more unrelated inhabitants from receiving food stamps was
unconstitutional because it was not rationally related to the statutory
"declaration of policy" and because its stated purpose - to prevent
"hippies" from participating in the food stamp program - was not legitimate
for equal protection purposes. 154 Similarly, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center,15 5 the Supreme Court struck down a statute requiring a special
use permit for a group home for the mentally retarded on the grounds that it
failed the rational basis test. In addition to finding many of the city council's
reject arguments that "community consensus" favors outlawing homosexual marriage. Id.
at 967. A request to enjoin the enforcement of the Supreme Judicial Court's decision was
denied. Largess, 373 F.3d at 229. In an analogous case, the Hernandez court held that
New York's domestic relations law violated the due process and equal protection clauses
of the New York constitution to the extent it prohibited gay marriage. Hernandez, 794
N.Y.S.2d at 579. In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that simply because
"prejudice against gay people may still prevail elsewhere cannot be a legitimate
justification for maintaining it in the marriage laws of this State. 'Private biases may be
outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect."'
Id. at 610 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)). Although only binding
in Massachusetts and New York, respectively, the acknowledgement in Goodridge and
Hernandez that public opposition to gay marriage is insufficient to justify legally
prohibiting it could prove an important early step toward the development of federal
constitutional jurisprudence regarding homosexual rights. Finally, there is empirical
evidence that service members' attitudes toward homosexuals are changing. A recent
study showed that fifty percent of junior enlisted officers are opposed to DADT, up from
only sixteen percent in 1992. New Poll Shows Shift, supra note 9. Therefore, although not
necessary to this analysis, it is worth acknowledging the possibility that homosexuals may
one day be treated as a suspect or quasi-suspect class. If that were to happen, it would
only further support the conclusions herein. Although judicial deference to military policy
may assist DADT in surviving strict or intermediate scrutiny, it seems much less likely
that a civilian statute that discriminates against homosexuals, like a veterans' preference
statute, would be sufficiently tailored toward serving a compelling or important
government interest to survive such scrutiny.
149. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
150. Id. at 487-88.
151. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
152. Id. at 634 (quoting Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
153. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534.
154. Id. at 533-34.
155. City of Cleburne,473 U.S. at 440.
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justifications not credible, the Court based its ruling, at least in part, on the
principle that the "negative attitude" of property owners adjacent to the
did not constitute a rational basis for requiring
facility toward its residents
56
permit.'
use
special
the
The Court has also applied this heightened rational basis standard to
classifications of homosexuals. In Romer v. Evans,157 the Court struck a
proposed amendment to the Colorado constitution prohibiting all
governmental action designed to protect homosexuals from discrimination.
In concluding that the amendment was not rationally related to a legitimate
government interest, the Court relied on the fact that the amendment seemed
"inexplicable by anything but animus toward [homosexuals]; it lacks a
rational relationship to legitimate state interests."' 158 It went on to explain
that the rational basis test "ensure[s] that classifications are not drawn for the
purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law." 159 Romer
represents a shift in the Court's rational basis jurisprudence toward a more
rigorous standard of review for statutes containing classifications that
disadvantage non-suspect groups, such as homosexuals, based on political
popularity or cultural standing.
This shift was acknowledged by Justice O'Connor in her concurrence
in Lawrence v. Texas, 160 when she noted that the Court has applied a "more
searching form of rational basis review" and has been most likely to overturn
a statute on rational basis grounds in cases where the statute in question
"exhibits such a desire to harm a politically unpopular group" or "inhibits
personal relationships."' 61 Justice O'Connor went on to conclude that
Texas's statute outlawing homosexual sodomy was unconstitutional because
"[m]oral disapproval of [homosexuals], like a bare desire to harm
to satisfy rational basis
[homosexuals], is an interest that is insufficient
' 62
review under the Equal Protection Clause."'
Veterans' preference statutes' treatment of homosexuals seems likely to
qualify for this "more searching form" of rational basis review.' 63 Although
DADT's primary purpose may not be to harm homosexuals, there is strong
evidence that it is motivated by homosexuals' status as "politically
unpopular." DADT's primary justification as a military policy is to promote
unit cohesion by protecting its members from even the appearance of

156. Id. at448.
157. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635-36.
158. Id. at 632.
159. Id. at 633.
160. 539 U.S. at 580 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
161. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
162. Id. at 582 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
163. See, e.g., Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the
Supreme Court Should Acknowledge its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to
Classifications Based on Sexual Orientation, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 2769 (2005)
(advocating heightened rational basis scrutiny for classifications based on sexual
preference).
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homosexuality among them.164 This approach presupposes that homosexuals
are so disfavored by other service members that the mere perception of a
homosexual presence will inhibit their ability to form cohesive units. Such a
justification for excluding a group seems to be precisely the sort that the
165
Court considered deserving of heightened rational basis scrutiny.
Therefore, while it remains unclear exactly how and when courts apply
Romer's elevated rational basis review, it is nevertheless significant because
the majority of cases in which statutes66have been overturned on rational basis
grounds applied that higher standard. 1
The availability of heightened rational basis review is also relevant as a
means of distinguishing DADT's role in veterans' preference statutes from
other military enrollment requirements. 167 For example, physical enrollment
standards 168 may exclude handicapped individuals from military service and,
in turn, veterans' preference benefits in much the same way that DADT may
prevent homosexuals from receiving those benefits. A closer look, however,
reveals that the military's treatment of the handicapped, unlike its treatment
of homosexuals, is not necessarily based on problems of public perception.
The military justifies its physical requirements on the grounds that they are
necessary to ensure job performance.' 69 By contrast, it justifies DADT by
contending that homosexuals' presence in the military will endanger morale

164. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 103-112, at 278 ("The presence in military units of persons
who, by their acts or statements, demonstrate a propensity to engage in homosexual acts,
would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order and
discipline, and unit cohesion that are essential to effective combat capability."); H.R. REP.
No. 103-200, at 287 ("[T]he committee concludes that homosexuality is incompatible with
military service."); 1993 DoD Directive 1332.14, E2.1.16 (defining statements by a
service member that he or she is homosexual as "[language or behavior that a reasonable
person would believe was intended to convey the statement that a person ... has a
propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts").
165. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 582 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Moral disapproval of
[homosexuals], like a bare desire to harm [homosexuals], is an interest that is insufficient
to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause."); Romer, 517 U.S. at
632 (striking the constitutional amendment because its adoption was "inexplicable by
anything but animus toward [homosexuals]; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate
state interests").
166. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 584 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
167. DADT is not the only means by which the military excludes potential service
members.
Physical and intellectual aptitude standards, for example, are standard
admissions criteria. See, e.g., Department of Defense Directive No. 6130.3 (Dec. 15,
2000) [hereinafter 2000 DoD Directive 6130.3] (describing physical standards for
appointment, enlistment or induction); Department of Defense Directive No. 1304.26
(Dec. 21, 1993) (describing qualification standards for appointment, enlistment or
induction). See also Department of the Navy, FAQ, http://www.navy.com/faq (last visited
July 20, 2005) (explaining some of the requirements for admission into the Navy). While
these criteria may themselves raise constitutional issues, any such issues are distinct from,
and beyond the scope of, this Article.
168. See, e.g., 2000 DoD Directive 6130.3 (setting forth physical enrollment standards).
169. See id. at 3.3.1, 3.3.2 (explaining that physical enrollment standards are designed
to ensure that potential service members are "free of contagious diseases ... [and] medical
conditions," and that they are medically capable of completing their training and military
duties).
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and unit cohesion due to their disfavored status in the community.17 0 While
the former justification has not been identified as grounds for heightened
rational basis review, the latter has. In cases where groups other than
homosexuals are prevented from serving in the military, the fact that those
other classifications are not due to those groups' political unpopularity may
be important to understanding why veterans' preferences' civilian
application of DADT should be judged more harshly than the civilian effects
of other military admission standards.
For these reasons, it is important to bear in mind the possibility that
courts may choose to perform a more searching rational basis review of
In the interest of
veterans' preferences' treatment of homosexuals.
simplicity, however, this analysis will rely on the traditional rational basis
standard, particularly because application of this more conservative standard
does not affect the ultimate conclusion that veterans' preference statutes'
treatment of homosexuals is constitutionally suspect.
B. Equal ProtectionAnalysis
In order to apply the rational basis test to veterans' preference statutes'
incorporation of DADT, it is important to define the policy. DADT lends
itself to two distinct interpretations, each of which affects the constitutional
analysis differently. For instance, DADT's early proponents described the
policy as a conditional acceptance of, rather than a ban on, homosexual
military service. 171 By contrast, a more literal reading of DADT and a
comparison of DADT to its predecessor policies suggest that DADT is, in
effect, nothing more than a continuation of the 1982 ban on homosexual
service. 172 In order to evaluate the constitutionality of veterans' preferences'
treatment of homosexuals, both of these interpretations must be considered.
What follows are two alternative rational basis analyses, each of which
focuses on a different interpretation of DADT. Once it is established that the
statutes contain a discriminatory classification, 173 the question under the

170. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 103-112, at 278 ("The presence in military units of persons
who, by their acts or statements, demonstrate a propensity to engage in homosexual acts,
would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order and
discipline, and unit cohesion that are essential to effective combat capability.").
171. 1993 DoD Directive 1332.14, E3.Al.1.8.1.1 (describing sexual orientation as "a
personal and private matter... not a bar to continued service.., unless manifested by
homosexual conduct"); Aspin Press Release, supra note 76 (stating that DADT was
designed "to emphasize that the DoD judges the suitability of persons to serve in the
Armed Forces on the basis of conduct, not sexual orientation").
172. See, e.g., discussion supra Part III.B; Wachs, supra note 94, at 315 (finding "little
to distinguish" DADT from "the former total ban" on homosexuals in the military);
Woodruff, supra note 47, at 153 ("[DADT] was a codification of the 1981 policy in all
material respects."); Krygowski, supra note 44, at 875 ("The 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell'
(DADT) policy, however, continues to ban admitted homosexuals or bisexuals from
remaining in the armed forces.").
173. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 1.
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rational basis test becomes: (1) whether the statutes address any legitimate
governmental
purpose and (2) whether they are rationally related to that
174
purpose.

1.

Legitimate GovernmentalPurpose?

The Supreme Court in Feeney cited four legitimate purposes for
veterans' preferences: (1) to reward veterans' service; (2) to incentivize that
service; (3) to attract loyal and well-disciplined people to public
employment; and (4) to facilitate the return of former service members to
civilian society. 75 Feeney, however, only analyzed the Massachusetts
veterans' preference statute's exclusion of non-veterans - it did not address
its disparate impact on women because it determined that the statute was
neither gender-based nor born of a discriminatory purpose. 1 76 By contrast,
veterans' preference statutes - through their incorporation of DADT - are
based on sexual preference 77 and, as a result, are subject to constitutional
review of their treatment of homosexuals. In order to conduct that inquiry, it
is necessary to also consider the justification advanced by DADT for its
discriminatory treatment of homosexuals.
DADT's legislative history justifies the policy on the grounds that it
promotes unit cohesion among service members,' 7 8 and courts have agreed
that military unit cohesion is a legitimate governmental aim.' 79 In the
veterans' preference context, however, it makes no sense to consider
cohesion within military units as a statutory purpose because the statutes do
18
80
Thus, two alternatives arise. 1
not apply to active service members.

174. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 446.

175. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 265. Although the Court in Feeney did not explicitly focus on
discharge characterizations in analyzing Massachusetts' veterans' preference statute, it
understood the statute to include only former service members who were honorably
discharged. Id. at 262.
176. See id. at 277-78 ("The basic distinction between veterans and non-veterans,
having been found not gender-based, and the goals of the preference having been found
worthy, [the statute] must be analyzed as is any other neutral law .....
177. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 1.
178. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 103-112, at 278 ("The presence in military units of persons
who, by their acts or statements, demonstrate a propensity to engage in homosexual acts,
would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order and
discipline, and unit cohesion that are essential to effective combat capability.").
The committee believes that military service is a unique calling that has no
counterpart in civilian society, and the primary purpose of the armed forces is to
prepare for and prevail in combat when necessary. Moreover, the committee firmly
believes that the maintenance of military unit cohesion-which is the key to combat
capability-and the promotion of morale, welfare, and discipline must remain
paramount over the desires of a single individual or group.
H.R. REP. No. 103-200, at 287.
179. See Able, 155 F.3d at 628 (upholding DADT); Holmes, 124 F.3d at 1126; Philips,
106 F.3d at 1420; Richenburg, 97 F.3d at 256; Thomasson, 80 F.3d at 915.
180. As explained above, evaluating DADT and veterans' preferences separately is
doctrinally and normatively unacceptable. It not only insulates DADT from traditional
rational basis review by granting it the judicial deference afforded military policies, but it
also leads to unjust results by replicating DADT's discriminatory treatment of homosexual
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DADT can either be interpreted as serving no governmental purpose when
applied in the civilian context (in which case it fails to satisfy equal
protection scrutiny and the analysis is complete) or, more plausibly, DADT
can be understood to retain a similar purpose in every context - to promote
group cohesion and morale. If this second interpretation is adopted,
determining DADT's constitutionality in the civilian context requires
projecting the policy's stated purpose into that context. In the case of
veterans' preferences, the applicable governmental purpose is, therefore, the
promotion and maintenance of unit cohesion among public employees.
2.

RationallyRelated?

After establishing the purposes behind veterans' preference statutes, the
second portion of the rational basis test asks whether those statutes are
rationally related to those ends. This requires a separate analysis of veterans'
preference statutes under each of the alternative interpretations of DADT.
a.

DADT as a Conditional Acceptance

If DADT is interpreted as a conditional acceptance of homosexual
service members, veterans' preference statutes are not categorically
vulnerable to a constitutional challenge. Because homosexuals are permitted
to serve under this interpretation,1 82 they may also be eligible for veterans'
preferences, provided they receive a discharge characterization that meets the
statutory requirements.18 3 Any equal protection challenge to veterans'
preference statutes under this interpretation must, therefore, be brought "as
applied" to an individual service member who was discharged and rendered
ineligible for veterans' preference benefits because he or she violated

service members in the public employment context. See discussion supra Part IV.A.1
(arguing that veterans' preferences should receive two layers of review because of their
incorporation of DADT into a civilian context).
181. Of course additional alternatives arise if additional justifications are presented for
DADT. That seems improbable, however, as DADT is a military policy with the singular
stated purpose of promoting unit cohesion in the military. "The presence in military units
of persons who, by their acts or statements, demonstrate a propensity to engage in
homosexual acts, would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good
order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are essential to effective combat capability." S.
REP. No. 103-112, at 278. It is therefore unlikely that DADT serves any additional
military purposes, let alone an independent civilian objective.
182. As discussed supra Part Ill.B, homosexual "service" is often at the pleasure of the
service members' commanding officers and is conditioned upon those service members
not "practicing" or "admitting" their homosexuality. 10 U.S.C. § 654; 1993 DoD
Directive 1332.14.
183. See S. REP. No. 103-112, at 290 ("The committee notes that military commanders
and investigative agencies have broad powers to initiate inquiries, inspections, and
investigations."); H.R. REP. No. 103-200, at 289 ("[T]he committee also believes that
commanders... should have great discretion as to what constitutes sufficient information
to begin an inquiry.., about behavior or actions that could have an impact on unit
cohesion, morale, welfare and discipline."); Wachs, supra note 94, at 316 ("Enforcement
of the 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' policy rests within the discretion of individual
commanders.").
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DADT. 184 In these cases, a challenger would seek reinstatement or benefits,
rather than invalidation of the statute. The constitutional inquiry in these
situations is whether veterans' preference statutes' exclusion of homosexuals
who were discharged under DADT is rationally related to any of the statutes'
legitimate governmental purposes. The answer appears to be no.
First, the exclusion of homosexual former service members from
veterans' preferences does nothing to promote unit cohesion in public
employment. 8 5 There is absolutely no evidence or reason to believe that
civil servants will somehow be inhibited in their duties because of the
presence of homosexuals in the workplace. To the contrary, studies have
shown that police and fire departments, the public employment contexts that
involve the most intimate working conditions and that are most closely
analogous to military service, have not experienced
any cohesion
86
deficiencies due to the presence of homosexuals.
Similarly, there is no connection between excluding homosexual
former service members from veterans' preference benefits and incentivizing
those individuals to serve in the military. Unlike the exclusion of nonveterans, which offers veterans' preferences in exchange for military service,
the exclusion of former service members who were discharged under DADT
only incentivizes individuals to avoid violating DADT. It has nothing to do
with their decision to serve in the first place and, therefore, cannot provide
an incentive for them to serve. To the extent that veterans' preferences can
be construed as wanting to encourage compliance with DADT, they likewise
fail rational basis review. As explained above, DADT forbids service

184. See, e.g., W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America v. Clark, 389 U.S. 309, 311 (1967)

(explaining that if an "Act does cover appellants, they may challenge its constitutionality
either as applied or on its face"). Despite appearing somewhat limited in their scope, these
"as applied" challenges are nevertheless important due to the large number of homosexual
service members who are discharged every year for violating DADT. See SEVENTH
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 115, at 4 (reporting the following number of discharges
under DADT in each of these years: 2001 (1273); 2000 (1241); 1999 (1046); 1998 (1163);
1997 (1007); 1996 (870); 1995 (772); 1994 (617)). In addition to being removed from the
military, many of these former service members will be precluded from receiving
veterans' preference benefits because their discharge characterizations will not meet the
statutory threshold. Discharge characterizations under DADT are subject to broad
discretion by commanding officers, and are often unfavorable. See Hearing, supra note
113 (testimony of Michelle M. Benecke, Co-Director, Servicemembers Legal Defense
Network) (explaining that the issue of discharge characterizations still "poses significant
problems for gay veterans").
185. Although Congress and the courts have found that DADT promotes unit cohesion
in the military, that rationale is not applicable in the civilian context.

Congress

acknowledged as much when it explained that "[m]ilitary life is fundamentally different
from civilian life in that... the unique conditions of military service, and the critical role
of unit cohesion, require that the military ... exist as a specialized society." 10 U.S.C.
§ 654(a)(8).
186. See Osburn, supra note 56, at 226 ("[I]t was the shared consensus of leaders across
each of the departments studied that a policy of non-discrimination had in no way
compromised their ability to perform their mission." (quoting RAND, NATIONAL DEFENSE
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY:
OPTIONS AND ASSESSMENT 141 (1993))).
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members from creating the perception that they are gay - it mandates
removal of any service member found to have attempted to engage in
conduct that may indicate a propensity to engage in same-sex sexual
contact. 187 It does not require that the alleged "conduct" be intentional or
even knowing.' 88 As a result, compliance with DADT is less a volitional act
and more a confluence of conduct, public perception, and official discretion.
Because of the number of factors beyond service members' control,
withholding benefits from those who violate DADT should not be considered
a rational means of incentivizing compliance.
As for the goal of attracting loyal and well-disciplined people to public
employment, legislators may indeed conclude that military training makes
service members more loyal and disciplined than civilians. 189 Even if that
conclusion is considered rational, it is still wholly unrelated to the exclusion
of homosexual former service members from veterans' preferences.
Homosexual service members receive the same lessons in loyalty and
discipline as their heterosexual colleagues, and there does not appear to be
any evidence that they are less receptive to those lessons - DADT does not
require service members to admit their homosexuality, nor does it claim to
be targeting disloyal or otherwise inadequate soldiers. 19° Therefore, there is
no rational relationship between excluding homosexual former service
members from veterans' preferences and assembling a loyal, well-disciplined
public workforce.
Finally, there is no rational basis for denying homosexual former
service members the rewards of veterans' preferences. Veterans' preference
statutes are designed to reward veterans with advantages in public
employment and to help facilitate their return to civilian life. Homosexual
former service members are no less deserving or needing of those benefits
merely because they were discharged under DADT. Removal under DADT
does not require that a service member fail to fulfill his or her duties as a
soldier, but only that the service member did as little as unknowingly behave
in a way that was interpreted as indicating a propensity to engage in
homosexual sexual contact.' 91 Although a violation of DADT under these
conditions can hardly be blamed on the service member, the broad discretion

187. See discussion supra Part III.B.

188. See discussion supra Part II.B.
189. This is not to endorse this conclusion. Rather, it is important to note that a rational
conclusion for purposes of the rational basis test does not necessarily have to be a factually
correct one. "Where rationality is the test, a State 'does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect."' Kimel v. Fla.
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 84 (2000) (quoting Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307, 316 (1976)). "Our Constitution permits States to draw lines on the basis of age when
they have a rational basis for doing so at a class-based level, even if it 'is probably not
true' that those reasons are valid in the majority of cases." Id. at 86.
190. See National Defense Authorization Act of 1994, 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000) (stating
that Secretary of Defense will not ask about potential service members' sexual
orientation); S. REP. NO. 103-112, at 278 (explaining that DADT is designed to promote
unit cohesion by removing apparent homosexuals from the military).
191. 10 U.S.C. § 654(e)(3)(B).
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afforded commanding officers in enforcing DADT and in assigning
discharge characterizations nevertheless results in homosexual service
members' removal with unfavorable discharges that render them ineligible
for veterans' preferences. 192 At minimum, in those situations where a service
member is rendered ineligible for a veterans' preference benefit solely
because they unknowingly violated DADT, it is irrational to deny them that
benefit on the basis that they do not deserve a reward for their service. On
the contrary, denying a preference to such an individual would constitute
irrational exclusion of an otherwise deserving former service member solely
on the basis
of their sexuality - an outcome that even DADT claims to
93
disfavor.'
In short, if DADT is interpreted as a conditional acceptance of, rather
than a ban on, homosexual military service, veterans' preference statutes
may be successfully challenged under the Equal Protection Clause when they
deny benefits to homosexual service members who were discharged under
DADT. These "as applied" challenges, although relevant to service
members who may be in jeopardy of violating DADT, do not, however,
implicate the broader constitutional question of whether veterans' preference
statutes' reliance on DADT violates the rights of homosexuals generally.
That question is addressed under the second interpretation of DADT - as an
outright ban on homosexual military service.
b.

DADT as Exclusion

If DADT is interpreted as prohibiting homosexuals from serving in the
military and, in turn, from being eligible for veterans' preferences, the
analysis changes. The constitutionality of veterans' preference statutes turns
on whether there is a rational basis for denying homosexuals veterans'
preferences.
Veterans' preference statutes' exclusion of non-veterans has already
been deemed rationally related to the goals of incentivizing and rewarding
service, attracting loyal and well-disciplined people to public employment,
and facilitating veterans' return to civilian life.194 If DADT is read to ban

192. See Hearing, supra note 113 (testimony of Michelle M. Benecke, Co-Director,
Servicemembers Legal Defense Network) (explaining that the issue of discharge
characterizations still "poses significant problems for gay veterans," and that there exists a
disturbing "lack of parity in the treatment of gay, compared to straight, personnel");
SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 115, at 64 (explaining that former members of the
Navy receive lower discharge characterizations for being discharged under DADT); FIFTH
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 115, at 16 (explaining that service members who admit to
being gay receive "lower discharge characterizations").
193. See Aspin Press Release, supra note 76 ("DoD judges the suitability of persons to
serve in the Armed Forces on the basis of conduct, not sexual orientation."); 1993 DoD
Directive 1332.14, E3.Al.1.8.1.1 (explaining that sexual orientation is "a personal and
private matter, and is not a bar to continued service... unless manifested by homosexual
conduct").
194. See, e.g., Koch, 533 F.2d at 80; Rios, 499 F.2d at 329; Russell, 470 F.2d at 212;
August, 369 F. Supp. at 190; Koelfgen, 355 F. Supp. at 243. See Glen, supra note 43, at
494-503 (listing earlier cases).
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homosexual service, then homosexuals are, for purposes of this portion of
the analysis, merely a subset of non-veterans. For example, the exclusion of
non-veterans is designed to incentivize service by offering veterans'
Because, under this
preferences in exchange for military service.
the first instance, it is
in
serve
interpretation of DADT, homosexuals cannot
to service. The same
related
benefits
perfectly rational not to include them in
other purposes. The
statutes'
the
to
conclusion can be reached with regard
rationally related to
is
preferences
exclusion of non-veterans from veterans'
employment - it
public
to
people
the goal of attracting loyal and disciplined
95
promotes
training
military
that
conclude
to
for legislators
is not irrational
from
non-veterans
of
exclusion
the
that
loyalty and discipline, and, therefore,
public
to
people
disciplined
and
loyal
more
veterans' preferences attracts
employment. Finally, veterans' preference statutes' reservation of benefits
for former service members is a rational means of rewarding prior service
and easing former service members' transition into civilian life.
At first blush, then, it seems that veterans' preference statutes are, when
interpreted as excluding homosexuals, rationally related to many of their
96
be constitutional.
governmental purposes. Therefore, the statutes would
The situation at hand, however, merits further consideration. As explained
above, veterans' preference statutes distinguish between veterans and nonveterans.' 97 They also, however, incorporate DADT, a policy that explicitly
discriminates against homosexuals, as a threshold requirement for eligibility.
These distinct forms of discrimination deserve distinct constitutional scrutiny
- veterans' preference statutes' treatment of homosexuals should not be
deemed constitutional simply because the statutes' distinction between
veterans and non-veterans is permissible. On the contrary, two layers of
constitutional review are necessary. Veterans' preferences' exclusion of
non-veterans must be analyzed separately from their treatment of
homosexuals in order to ensure that the military's discrimination against
homosexuals is not inadvertently expanded into other aspects of society and
law. This is especially important in the context of a rational basis review,
where a single rational justification is sufficient to pass constitutional
muster.98
DADT has been upheld as constitutional in the military context
primarily due to the deference afforded military policies by Congress and the

195. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 84 ("[W]here rationality is the test, a State 'does not violate
the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are
imperfect."' (quoting Murgia, 427 U.S. at 316)).
196. See, e.g., id. at 83-84 ("As we have explained, when conducting rational basis
review 'we will not overturn such [government action] unless the varying treatment of
different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of
legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the [government's] actions were
irrational."' (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979))).
197. More specifically, they discriminate between veterans with a sufficient discharge
characterization and those without one. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
198. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83-84.
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As the courts have explained in cases analyzing its
constitutionality, DADT passes the rational basis test because military
personnel and members of Congress have determined that military life is so
radically different from civilian life that the military cannot tolerate even
apparent homosexuality without losing the ability to function in cohesive
units. 200 Veterans' preference statutes, however, implicate DADT in the
process of determining eligibility for preferences in civilian public
employment. Not only does civilian public employment not require the
degree of unit cohesion necessary in the military, 20 1 but attempts at justifying
discrimination against homosexuals on the basis of unit cohesion have been
rejected in those areas of civilian life most military in nature - police and
fire departments 2°2 - and have even been statutorily precluded in some
states. 2°3 There is no rational relationship between veterans' preference
statutes' exclusion of homosexuals and unit cohesion in public employment.
Despite the fact that they serve many of their stated goals, veterans'
preference statutes require closer scrutiny. Rather than simply evaluating
their proffered reasons for excluding non-veterans, veterans' preference
statutes' incorporation of DADT necessitates that their constitutionality also
be examined in light of DADT's reasons for excluding homosexuals from
service. Since veterans' preference statutes do not satisfy the rational basis
test with respect to the latter, they should not pass muster under the Equal
Protection Clause.
courts.

199. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981) ("The case arises in the
context of Congress' authority over national defense and military affairs, and perhaps in

no other area has the Court accorded Congress greater deference.").
200. See supra note 118 (citing cases).
201. H.R. REP. No. 103-200, at 287.
The committee believes that military service is a unique calling that has no
counterpart in civilian society, and the primary purpose of the armed forces is to
prepare for and prevail in combat when necessary. Moreover, the committee firmly
believes that the maintenance of military unit cohesion-which is the key to combat
capability-and the promotion of morale, welfare, and discipline must remain
paramount over the desires of a single individual or group. The committee further
concludes that combat capability is unalterably tied to the ability of the armed
forces to foster mutual trust and confidence among service members; to ensure
integrity of the system of rank and command; to facilitate assignment and
worldwide deployment of service members who frequently must live and work
under close conditions affording minimal privacy; to recruit and retain members of
the military services; to maintain the public acceptability of military service; and to

prevent breaches of security.
Id.
202. See Osburn, supra note 56, at 226 ("[I]t was the shared consensus of leaders across
each of the departments studied that a policy of non-discrimination had in no way
compromised their ability to perform their mission." (quoting RAND, supra note 186, at
141)).
203. See Eisenmenger, supra note 120, at 235 (citing Davis, supra note 120, at 32)
(noting that eleven states and the District of Columbia forbid discrimination based on
sexual orientation in public employment).
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V.
An analysis of the constitutionality of veterans' preference statutes'
treatment of homosexuals raises a number of questions, the answers to which
support the conclusion that the statutes violate the Equal Protection Clause.
Veterans' preferences discriminate against homosexuals through their
incorporation of DADT. However, because DADT's status as a military
policy entitles it to a more lenient standard of constitutional review, its
application in the civilian veterans' preference context must be examined
independently from its military application. Regardless of how DADT is
interpreted, this examination reveals constitutional problems. If DADT is
viewed as a conditional acceptance of homosexual service members,
veterans' preferences are vulnerable to "as applied" constitutional challenges
because the exclusion of homosexual former service members from benefits
is not rationally related to any of the statutes' stated purposes. Alternatively,
if DADT is considered a prohibition on homosexual service, veterans'
preferences are likewise constitutionally infirm, as there is no rational basis
for excluding homosexuals from public employment benefits.
This is not to ignore, however, the dilemma created by the suggestion
that veterans' preference statutes are unconstitutional. Their goals of
incentivizing, rewarding, and assisting service members' return home are
The unavoidable problem, however, is that
admirable pursuits.
from military service for reasons particular to the
prohibited
homosexuals,
a second time by preference statutes.
disadvantaged
military, find themselves
of preferential treatment over nondeserving
be
may
Just because veterans
veterans does not mean that civilian law can adopt otherwise unconstitutional
military standards with impunity.
Although there is not one clear solution to this problem, there are some
potentially constitutionally acceptable measures available in both the military
and civilian contexts. If DADT is interpreted as a conditional acceptance of
homosexual service members, one solution may be simply to amend DADT
to require that service members discharged solely for violating DADT
receive honorable discharges. While this would virtually eliminate the need
for as-applied challenges to veterans' preferences, it may prove politically
difficult. Putting the onus for change on DADT, rather than veterans'
preferences themselves, requires the amendment of a controversial military
policy for civilian purposes, a prospect that may not resonate with Congress
or the military.
In lieu of seeking to change DADT, veterans' preference statutes may
be able to avoid a constitutional problem by focusing less on discharge
characterization to determine eligibility - a practice subject to commanding
officers' broad discretion - and more on the actual grounds for discharge.
DADT is too broad and discretionary to be relied upon as an accurate
measure of an individual's service; as explained above, a violation of DADT
does not require any knowing or conscious conduct by the offending service
member. Therefore, a violation of DADT should not be considered
sufficient to support a less favorable discharge characterization and, in turn,
the denial of veterans' benefits.
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Instead, where a service member was discharged with an unacceptable
discharge characterization, veterans' preference statutes could avoid
unconstitutionally discriminating against that service member by basing his
or her eligibility for benefits on the reason for their unfavorable discharge. If
the service member was discharged solely for violating DADT, he or she
would not be excluded from receiving veterans' benefits. This would protect
homosexuals discharged under DADT from commanders' broad discretion in
assigning discharge characterizations, and would help ensure that benefits
are available to all those who served honorably, not only to those who served
honorably and did not happen to be perceived as homosexual. An additional
advantage of this approach is that it does not require amending either the
statutes' or DADT's standards with respect to discharge characterizations.
Instead, it simply guarantees that homosexuals who earned a discharge
characterization that entitles them to benefits are not denied that
characterization simply because they were deemed to have violated
DADT.2 °4
Alternatively, if DADT is interpreted (as this Article contends it should
be) as a ban on homosexual service, a workable solution is more elusive.
The constitutional infirmity under this interpretation lies in the total
exclusion of homosexuals from veterans' preferences, and the fact that their
exclusion is not rationally related to promoting unit cohesion in public
employment. Because homosexuals cannot satisfy the statutes' threshold
requirement of military service in this scenario, the only means of addressing
the constitutional problem is either through redefining the term "veterans" in
veterans' preference statutes, or by making DADT less exclusive. The first
suggestion would require expanding the definition of veterans to include
groups of civil or public servants that are worthy of public employment
benefits but that do not discriminate against homosexuals. This approach,
however, would not only expand the number of people eligible for public
employment benefits in such a way as to dilute their value, but would fail to
meet the statutes' goal of rewarding former service members.
The remaining source of reform lies within DADT itself. Although
DADT is constitutional as a military policy, it is clearly flawed. Until
DADT is either repealed or amended, such that it does not effectively
prohibit homosexual service, the term "veteran" will be synonymous with
204. This is not to say that the military should be required to maintain and divulge a

discharge file for each and every service member that is removed from the military.
DADT grants service members a hearing to rebut any presumption that they engaged in
homosexual conduct. See 1993 DoD Directive 1332.14, E3.Al.l.8.1.2.2 ("The Service
member shall be advised of this presumption and given the opportunity to rebut the
presumption by presenting evidence that he or she does not engage in, attempt to engage
in, have a propensity to engage in, or intend to engage in homosexual acts."). The record
of that hearing could be made available upon request by a service member as evidence that
he or she was discharged solely for violating DADT. This would grant the service
member control over whether information about his or her discharge became public, would
prevent service members who were discharged for reasons other than DADT from
attempting to take advantage of the exception, and would avoid creating any increased
administrative costs for the military.
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discrimination against homosexuals, and any attempt by civilian society to
single out veterans as a class will be constitutionally suspect. Moreover, if
current trends in civil rights jurisprudence continue, constitutional challenges
to veterans' benefits will likely be more successful. Therefore, taking
DADT as a ban on homosexual military service, veterans' preference statutes
stand to survive constitutional scrutiny only if veterans' benefits are made
available to groups that do not exclude homosexuals, or if DADT is amended
to treat homosexuals in a way that is constitutionally acceptable outside of
the military. Such measures, although seemingly drastic, may be necessary
to protect homosexuals from being discriminated against twice by the same
policy - once when they are rejected or removed from the military, and again
when that rejection or removal precludes them from qualifying for veterans'
preferences.
In short, veterans' preference statutes' incorporation of DADT renders
them constitutionally infirm under the Equal Protection Clause. This is
significant with respect to veterans' preferences because they are an
important part of state and federal employment law. It also raises the larger
question of whether any civilian legislation or policy favoring veterans is
constitutional as long as DADT exists in its current form. While judicial
deference to military policy may be justifiable, it should not be so easily
transferred into the civilian context. Military policies like DADT must be
newly examined when applied to civilian life in order to avoid
unconstitutionally replicating their discriminatory effects.

